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Abstract 
In two unrelated papers, we examine different aspects of mutual fund performance and other 
issues. In the first chapter, we look at exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and how they differ from 
index funds in performance and tracking error. Using daily data and a more comprehensive 
sample than past research, we find abnormal returns associated with the ETFs are higher than the 
alphas of the index funds in most cases. The results are much more prevalent in funds that follow 
the S&P 500 than funds that do not. When examining the tracking errors, we find index funds are 
able to track their indexes much better than ETFs and domestic ETFs are better than ETFs that 
track international indexes. In our most significant finding, we find that tracking error affects 
fund flow in the following period. While fund flows are generally increasing for both ETFs and 
index funds, funds that track their respective index better increase their net assets by a larger 
percentage than funds that track their index less well. 
 
In the second chapter, we look at the differences in performance and characteristics of mutual 
funds as they relate to the manager’s gender. Using a larger sample and different techniques than 
have been used in the past, we find some differences in our matched comparison which suggest 
female managers have a lower risk tolerance than males. Females also tend to hold a higher 
number of assets (stocks) and fewer assets in their top 10 holdings than do male managers. In, 
pooled regressions, we find weak, but significant evidence that current female fund managers, 
when analyzed as a group, show slightly lower performance than male managers. We then 
analyze performance within funds over time. Our most consistent result is that when changing 
the composition of fund management, regardless of gender, the new management has 
significantly greater performance than prior management. We also find some evidence, although 
 viii
not conclusive, that the percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively related to 
the fund’s performance over time. Finally, we find the determinants of abnormal returns cannot 
be attributed to the fund manager’s gender. 
 
Keywords: Exchange-Traded Funds, ETFs, index mutual funds, tracking error, mutual funds, 
manager characteristics, gender differences, fund performance 
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Introduction 
In this dissertation, two unrelated topics are examined regarding mutual fund performance. In the 
first paper, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are compared to index mutual funds to see which 
performs better and which has lower tracking error relative to the indexes they track. The second 
paper makes an attempt to determine and differences between female and male mutual fund 
managers and tries to discern whether female or male mutual fund managers have better 
performance controlling for many factors. 
 
Exchange-traded funds have become a growing phenomenon in recent years. However, the 
literature is sparse on all but the largest ETFs. Specifically, Spiders – the first ETF, and one that 
closely mimics the S&P 500 index – a broad market index, is far and away the most studied ETF. 
Missing in current literature is a comprehensive study on other ETFs. With several new ETFs 
being issued each month, a comprehensive study is long overdue. 
 
Using daily data, we find abnormal returns associated with the ETFs are higher than the alphas 
of the index funds in most cases. This result is in contrast to previous results that conclude that 
index funds tend to have higher alphas than ETFs. The results are much more prevalent in funds 
that follow the S&P 500 than funds that do not. One explanation for the difference in results is 
the more comprehensive sample of ETFs analyzed here. We find confirming results that ETFs 
have higher abnormal returns than index funds. Other important factors for index funds include 
the relative size of a fund when compared with other funds following the same index and the 
Herfindahl index (given funds following a single index constitute an industry). For ETFs, the 
inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and relative size are all important determinants 
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of abnormal return. When examining the tracking errors for ETFs and index funds, we find index 
funds are able to track their indexes much better than ETFs and domestic ETFs are better than 
ETFs that track indexes in other countries. The most significant finding of this paper is that 
tracking error affects fund flow in the following period. While fund flows are generally 
increasing for both ETFs and index funds, funds that track their respective index better increase 
their net assets by a larger percentage than funds that track their index less well. 
 
There has been a large body of literature on the investment behavioral differences of men and 
women. Separately, much work has been done in the past decade trying to determine whether 
managers add value to the funds that they manage. However, only one prior study, Atkinson et 
al. (2003), has specifically examined whether gender might influence the mutual fund manager’s 
investment decisions. They use domestic fixed-income funds. This study examines this topic 
with a larger sample by using monthly returns from domestic (U.S.) stock mutual funds. 
 
We find some differences in our matched comparison which suggest female managers have a 
lower risk tolerance (standard deviation). Females also tend to hold a higher number of assets 
(stocks) and fewer assets in their top 10 holdings than do male managers. In our regressions, 
when female and male managers’ returns are pooled and compared with each other, we find 
weak, but significant evidence that current female fund managers, when analyzed as a group, 
show slightly lower performance than male managers. We then analyze performance within 
funds over time. Here, the most consistent result is that when changing the composition of fund 
management, regardless of gender, the new management has significantly greater performance 
than prior management. Although not conclusive, there is some evidence that one would receive 
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a larger increase in performance if investing in a fund that is decreasing the percentage of its 
female management, although both increasing and decreasing the percentage of female managers 
will result in better returns with new management. We also find that the percentage of female 
managers managing a fund is negatively related to the fund’s performance over time. Finally, we 
find that the determinants of abnormal returns (e.g. expense ratio, net assets, etc.) cannot be 
attributed to the gender of the fund managers. 
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Chapter 1: On Performance & Tracking Error in Exchange-Traded 
Funds and Index Mutual Funds 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and index mutual funds have similar objectives in that 
they attempt to closely match some index using a passive management strategy. However, the 
way that they are formed is somewhat different. Each one is organized in such a way that they 
have distinct cost structures and a slightly differing ability to accurately follow their given 
indexes. 
 
Because ETFs and index mutual funds work differently but have similar objectives, it is 
interesting to examine the ability of each to match the performance of its index. Past studies 
suggest that while ETFs generally underperform their index fund counterparts in the short-term 
due to transactions costs, they overcome this shortcoming in the long-term by having slightly 
lower management expenses. However, ETFs have been very popular among short-term traders 
due to their trading advantages over mutual funds. Since ETFs tend to have relatively short 
histories, almost all studies look at a very limited data set – one or two ETFs and one or two 
index funds. This study expands on this limitation to look at several types of funds. By using 
funds that have not been studied in the past, we provide a more comprehensive idea of how ETFs 
and index mutual funds compare as a group rather than only looking at funds that track the S&P 
500 or another popular index. 
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Using daily data, we find abnormal returns (alphas) associated with the ETFs are higher 
than the alphas of the index funds in most cases. This result directly contradicts results from 
previous literature. One explanation for this is that we look at a much larger sample of ETFs than 
do prior studies. Higher ETF alphas are much more prevalent in funds that follow the S&P 500 
than funds that do not. This finding may be the result of ETF managers improving their 
performance by timing their modifications to the fund in order to minimize transactions costs.1 
 
We also look at which components of abnormal return are important determinants. We 
find confirming results that ETFs have higher abnormal returns than index funds. Other 
important factors for index funds include the relative size of a fund when compared with other 
funds following the same index and the Herfindahl index (given funds following a single index 
constitute an industry). For ETFs, the inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and 
relative size are all important determinants of abnormal return. 
 
Another major issue when examining ETFs and index funds is “tracking error.” The 
difference between an ETF or index fund’s return and the return of the index that it is following 
is defined as its tracking error. Tracking error has several possible causes discussed in the next 
section. We examine the tracking error for both ETFs and index funds and compare them to each 
other to see which type of fund has less tracking error. Then, we determine if tracking error 
affects fund flow in subsequent periods. Our findings show that index funds are able to track 
their indexes much better than ETFs and domestic ETFs are better than ETFs that track indexes 
in other countries. The most significant finding of this paper is that tracking error affects fund 
flow in the following period. While fund flows are generally increasing for both ETFs and index 
                                                 
1 Gastineau (2004) says this method is common among index fund managers. 
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funds, funds that track their respective index better increase their net assets by a larger 
percentage than funds that track their index less well. This result is important since it suggests 
that investors react to tracking errors. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II is a review ETFs and describes 
similarities and differences between index funds and ETFs. The third section delves into the 
previous literature on the topics analyzed here. The fourth section looks at the specific analyses 
and models used in this study. Section V describes the data. The sixth section presents the 
empirical evidence, and the final section draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Background 
Exchange-Traded Funds have become a phenomenon in recent years. In 1993, the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) created the first ETF based in the United States, the 
Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts (SPY), or SPDRs or Spiders for short. It was the only 
ETF until two years later, when AMEX created the S&P Midcap Depository Receipt (MDY). At 
the end of 1995, Spiders were averaging about 300,000 shares traded per day. By April 2007, the 
average daily trading volume for Spiders was over 100,000,000 shares per day, more than a 300-
fold increase in just over 10 years. Further, by April 2007, average daily trading volume for all 
ETFs was more than 508,000,000 shares per day. 
 
ETFs have become so popular that they are no longer limited to tracking standard, broad-
based indexes such as the S&P 500 that use broad criteria like market capitalization. They now 
frequently track very specialized indexes. Some of these indexes focus on specific investment 
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styles or market sectors. There are ETFs that follow bond indexes, and others that buy dividend-
paying stocks or issues from certain countries or regions. Recently, an ETF was created to track a 
socially responsible stock index, and two others now track the price of gold. ETFs are expanding 
so quickly that many analysts have predicted that they may take away some of the market share 
of index mutual funds. 
 
To get a better understanding of why ETFs have recently become so popular, one must 
understand how they work. Exchange-traded funds are similar to index mutual funds. However, 
there are important differences. The most obvious to traders is that although ETFs are bundles of 
stocks that have net asset values (NAVs) computed similarly to mutual funds, they are traded at 
market-determined prices that adjust throughout the day based on supply and demand. Index 
fund prices are defined as their NAV which is calculated once per day after the market closes. 
Therefore, there are no intra-day price changes on index mutual funds as there are with ETFs. 
Due to their ability to trade on the secondary market, ETFs act like closed end funds. 
 
Another important difference is in the way that shares are created and sold. Index fund 
shares are created by the fund at the time investors purchase shares of the fund. By contrast, 
ETFs issue shares in large blocks called “Creation Units.” Creation Units are then broken up into 
individual shares and sold on the secondary market where individual investors usually trade 
them. When selling ETFs, investors must either sell them on the secondary market or sell the 
Creation Units back to the ETF. When selling the Creation Units back to the ETF, the investor 
will normally receive the actual securities that are in the ETF rather than cash. This is called 
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“redemption-in-kind.” This feature makes the management fees of ETFs (normally) cheaper than 
index funds since the fund has no responsibility for keeping accounting records for the investor. 
 
Exchange-traded funds are registered investment companies just as index funds, closed-
end funds and other mutual funds. They may be registered as open-ended funds, unit investment 
trusts, or set up as grantor trusts. Open-end funds are the most common structure and are similar 
to typical mutual funds. The unit investment trust structure is only used by about eight ETFs, 
however these include four of the oldest, most liquid funds: Spiders, S&P Midcap, Diamonds 
(Dow Jones Industrials) and Cubes (Nasdaq 100 Index). Finally, some exchange-traded funds 
have been created as grantor trusts. Unlike the other types of ETFs, these trusts are not registered 
with the SEC as investment companies. So, even though they act similarly to ETFs, they are not 
strictly ETFs by definition. Also unlike ETFs, they typically do not track a specific index (Scott 
and Henrich, 2005). They represent an investor's ownership in common stock of specified 
companies in a particular industry, sector or group. Examples of grantor trusts are HOLDRs 
issued by Merrill Lynch. Since the data for the indexes is not available for these funds, they will 
not be included in the analysis. 
 
Exchange-traded fund assets are very concentrated. As of April 30, 2007, there are 432 
equity ETFs. The largest four equity ETFs by total net assets are Standard & Poor’s Depository 
Receipts, (SPDR - SPY), iShares MSCI EAFE Index Fund (EFA), iShares S&P 500 (IVV) and 
NASDAQ 100 Trust Shares (Cubes - QQQQ). These four ETFs account for 32% of the assets in 
all equity ETFs. Further, the ten largest ETFs account for 48% of assets, and the larger half of 
ETFs account for 98.4% of all assets in equity ETFs. While highly concentrated, the ETFs are 
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much less concentrated than just a few years ago. Poterba and Shoven (2002) reported that in 
November of 2001, that the SPDR trust and the NASDAQ 100 trust accounted for nearly three-
quarters of the total net assets in all ETFs (at that time, there were no non-equity ETFs). 
 
ETF trading is also very concentrated. The three ETFs with the largest average daily 
trading volume (three-month average) are Cubes, SPDRs, and iShares Russell 2000 Index 
(IWM). These three ETFs account for 54% of the trading volume in all equity ETFs. Further, the 
ten largest ETFs account for 74% of trading volume in equity ETFs. In fact, fully one-half of 
ETFs account for 99.5% of all equity ETF trading, suggesting that many ETFs are not very 
liquid. 
 
U.S.-registered investment companies managed a record $9.5 trillion by the end of 2005. 
This constituted about an $900 billion increase from 2004. Mutual funds held $8.9 trillion of this 
total, or about 94%. Among other types of investment companies, closed-end fund assets totaled 
$276 billion, ETFs surpassed the assets of closed-end funds for the first time and held $296 
billion2 and unit investment trust (UITs) assets were $41 billion at the end of 2005 (2006 ICI 
Factbook, p. 3). Figure 1 compares total net assets in each type of investment company for 
eleven years from 1995 to 2005. Even though it is apparent that mutual funds, closed-end funds 
and exchange-traded funds have been increasing in popularity over the entire 10-year period, 
only ETFs continued in popularity even in the down market of 2000 – 2002. The most recent 
data indicates that, as of April 30, 2007, ETF assets have increased to $455 billion: an increase of 
54% in just 16 months!
                                                 
2 Note: Figures for this paragraph include non-equity as well as equity ETFs. However, as of April 30, 2007, non-
equity ETFs account for only 5.3% of assets and 0.6% of trading volume in ETFs. 
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Figure 1.1: Total Investment Company Assets 
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Another advantage of ETFs can be seen because of the way that they trade. ETFs may be 
purchased on margin, sold short, and traded with limit and stop-loss orders, unlike index mutual 
funds. This adds to the ETFs’ attractiveness for many purchasers due to the considerable 
flexibility in trading. ETFs also are not subject to the uptick rule when being sold short, 
presumably because trading in ETFs is like trading an index of stocks rather than a single stock. 
Short selling an index is less risky and less likely to cause a panic in any single stock within the 
index. 
 
The sheer popularity of ETFs is demonstrated in Figure 2. In this illustration, net fund 
inflows are shown for mutual funds and ETFs. The inflows for mutual funds have started to 
decline in the past few years as is shown by the 5-year moving average line. In contrast, the 
inflows for ETFs have continued to increase every year. The 5-year moving average line for 
ETFs only shows a slight hesitation in 2003, but even in that year there was a net increase in 
fund inflows into ETFs. 
 
Exchange-traded funds and index mutual funds have expenses that are similar in some 
ways and dissimilar in others. This is because of the way each trades. Since exchange-traded 
funds are traded in the secondary market, trades are exposed to commissions and bid-ask 
spreads. Index funds are primary market instruments and are subject to capital gains taxes and 
loads (if applicable). A comparison of costs to both exchange-traded funds and index mutual 
funds is shown in Table 1.1.1 
 
                                                 
1 Kostovetsky (2003) lists most of these in his paper as well. 
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Figure 1.2: Net Fund Inflows 
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Table 1.1. ETF-Index Fund Cost Comparison 
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Two other considerations regarding ETFs are tracking error and market pricing. Tracking 
error may be the result of the dividend policy of the ETF. ETFs usually distribute dividends 
quarterly, but the stocks that are held in the ETFs distribute dividends throughout the quarter. 
This lag can affect the tracking ability of the ETF. Market pricing may also contribute to tracking 
error, especially if the ETF trades consistently at a premium or discount from its NAV. While 
mutual funds always trade at the NAV, ETF prices are determined by supply and demand in the 
market place. Unlike closed-end funds which may trade at rather large discounts (or premiums 
theoretically) to their NAVs, ETFs almost always trade in a narrow range around their NAVs. 
This is because any large deviation will be arbitraged away quickly by large investors who 
purchase (sell) the underlying stocks in the index while simultaneously selling (purchasing) ETF 
shares. Another reason for tracking error comes from the timing of a fund in its adjustments 
toward index composition changes. For example, when an index, such as the S&P 500 
announces that it will add and remove stocks or adjust the weights of the stocks in its portfolio, 
index funds tracking that index must also adjust. Some funds will adjust immediately, while 
others will wait until the index changes take effect a few days later. This timing differential will 
affect the funds tracking ability. 
 
ETFs are often used as investments which provide broad diversification with the purchase 
of a single share. But more and more, investors are using ETFs in ways that are more 
sophisticated. Hedging has become a popular use of ETFs especially against futures positions 
that do not have a very good alternate hedging instrument. Hasbrouck (2003) finds that in the 
absence of a futures contract, ETFs provide significant information on price discovery.1 Large 
                                                 
1 Demaine (2002) reviews the advantages of ETFs from the perspective of the sophisticated investor. He observes 
specifically, that ETFs greatest value may be in the way that they can substitute for futures when there is no futures 
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investors, such as institutions are using ETFs to bet on declines in the market or a particular 
industry by short selling them. Often there are options on ETFs which also may be used for 
hedging or to speculate on directional shifts in the market or an industry. 
 
3. Literature Review 
Surprisingly, literature in the area of exchange-traded funds has not caught the attention 
yet of many academic researchers, and therefore, ETFs are not represented strongly in many top 
scholarly journals. There are numerous scholarly articles about mutual funds and index funds, 
however. 
 
3.1. Actively Managed Funds 
In a very early work, Jensen (1968) found that actively managed mutual funds performed 
worse than a “buy-the-market-and-hold” strategy even when measuring returns before 
management fees were deducted from the actively managed funds. John Bogle (1998) 
demonstrated that low-cost funds were directly correlated with high returns on a risk-adjusted 
basis. His analysis suggests that passively managed index funds are a better investment than 
actively managed funds due to their higher average return and lower cost. Bogle believes that 
these factors, combined with their lower risk, make index funds superior to actively managed 
funds on a risk-adjusted basis. Frino and Gallagher (2001) come to the same conclusion when 
comparing the S&P 500 index funds with actively managed funds.2 
                                                                                                                                                             
contract available for a particular market or industry. He also notes that the liquidity of the ETF itself is not as 
important as the liquidity of the market that it tracks, since the basket of stocks in an ETF share derives its value 
directly from the stocks that it holds in the underlying market. 
2 However, Minor (2001) disagrees to some extent. He claims that actively managed funds can perform better than 
index funds. Using the same methodology as Bogle, Minor finds that whether index funds outperform managed 
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Gruber (1996) suggests a puzzle that is evident from Bogle’s comments. He proposes the 
question, “Why do investors invest in actively managed funds when, on average, they have 
performed worse than index funds?” He believes that he has an explanation for this puzzle. 
Performance is predictable if it is not priced in mutual funds’ NAVs and management ability 
contributes to the performance. Because of this, flows into funds should also be predictable 
because some investors are aware of this performance predictability. This implies that investors 
investing in some actively managed mutual funds are indeed rational, and therefore solves the 
puzzle of why people invest in actively managed funds. 
 
Shukla (2004) also looks at active portfolio management. He attempts to measure the 
value of interim portfolio revision to the fund to see if there is value added. He shows that this 
active management does not add significantly to portfolio returns. The implication of Shukla’s 
results is that shareholders are not receiving any benefit for the fees that they are paying to the 
managers of the funds that they hold. He does note that there is a high degree of variability with 
his results however, and some managers do add value to the funds that they manage. He also 
shows that higher excess returns are associated with higher expense ratios, and claims that this 
suggests managers benefit the most from the higher expenses in these funds. 
 
Harper et al. (2006) use ETFs for foreign markets and compare them with foreign closed-
end funds. They find that ETFs have higher mean returns and higher Sharpe ratios than foreign 
closed-end funds, and the foreign closed-end funds have negative alphas. They believe that this 
                                                                                                                                                             
funds depends entirely upon the sample period used for comparison. He finds that in the 5-year period just prior to 
the 5-year period that Bogle used, actively managed funds outperformed index funds. 
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suggests that the passive investment strategy of the ETFs may be superior to an active strategy 
using foreign closed-end funds. 
 
3.2. ETFs and Index Funds 
Dellva (2001) performs a simulation exercise with one mutual fund and both ETFs that 
follow the S&P 500. He determined that small investors and short-term investors benefited most 
by investing in the mutual fund that he chose for his study. While helpful to investors that want 
to follow a broad market index, this study was very limited in its scope. Since only one index 
was used and three investment vehicles, drawing wide-ranging conclusions based upon study 
would be somewhat tenuous. Elton, Gruber, Comer and Li (2002) also studied Spiders and S&P 
500 index funds. They find that Spiders underperform the index funds by about 18 basis points 
per year. They believe that the ability to trade Spiders throughout the day provides a value that 
more than outweighs this small discrepancy in performance. They explain that Spiders are often 
used as a risk control mechanism and for short-term trading. Also, even though they may offer 
less return than some futures contracts, they have the advantage of being able to trade in much 
smaller increments. Poterba and Shoven (2002) examine the differences in returns between the 
SPDR trust and the Vanguard Index 500 fund. Both of these securities follow the S&P 500 index 
and have the advantage of being the largest ETF and the largest mutual fund. They show that 
ETFs perform virtually as well as index funds. 
 
Kostovetsky (2003) shows that under any reasonable circumstances, a small investor 
would prefer an index mutual fund over the corresponding ETF. Also, larger investors normally 
will benefit from investing in ETFs, especially if their holding period is of sufficient length. The 
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“sufficient length” depends upon the amount invested. The more invested, the shorter the length 
of time for the benefits of ETFs to outweigh the costs.  
 
Gastineau (2004) looks at the question of why ETFs underperform index funds that track 
the same index. His focus is the operational efficiency of the funds’ management. By inspecting 
the historical returns (through 2002) of iShares, Spiders, and Vanguard indexes following the 
S&P 500 and the Russell 2000, he notes that the ETFs typically underperform their respective 
index funds. He conjectures that a significant portion of the underperformance is likely due to the 
failure of ETF fund managers to reduce their transactions costs in a way that is common among 
index fund managers. When indexes change their composition and/or weighting, the index fund 
manager will time his modifications to the fund in order to minimize transactions costs. He also 
notes that although there are no legal barriers against this timing in ETFs, ETF managers have 
not yet adopted this method of cost reduction. The explanation for the ETF underperformance 
Gastineau posits seems reasonable, but since there is no analytical methodology incorporated in 
his paper, a broader, academic study is clearly needed to determine if his argument has merit. We 
look at a broader range of ETFs and a more current data set to see if the underperformance holds 
for the broader range of ETFs or just the small subset used by Gastineau. 
 
In an early work on ETFs, Olienyk et al. (1999) find short-term causal relationships 
between the ETFs, suggesting arbitrage and opportunities market inefficiencies. Demaine (2002) 
points out that sector-based ETFs were inevitable, especially in Europe. This is because recent 
trends have indicated that country-based correlations are increasing, making diversification by 
country less meaningful in Europe since the introduction of the European Union (Eurozone). 
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However, the industry-based correlations have been declining at the same time, making sector-
based investing more attractive. Engle and Sarkar (2002) conclude that domestic ETFs are 
normally priced very close to their market value. They have less confidence when considering 
international funds which are less actively traded and therefore less precisely priced. However, 
they surmise that since these ETFs operate in a more stringent environment, they may still be 
close to correctly priced. On the other hand, Madura and Ritchie (2004) find a strong 
overreaction in ETFs during the 1998 – 2002 period when technology issues appear to have been 
over-priced. They found greater overreaction in ETFs that were more volatile and in international 
ETFs.3 Jares and Lavin (2004) find that the daily returns of Asian (specifically Japan and Hong 
Kong) iShares are well correlated with daily S&P 500 returns. These ETFs show significant 
power when trying to predict movements in the respective country stock markets. Jares and 
Lavin (2004) also show that profitable trading strategies may be implemented that take 
advantage of Asian iShares’ overprediction of next day returns to NAV. This line of literature 
suggests that there is a fundamental difference between domestic and international ETFs and 
index funds. Therefore, it may be useful to account for this difference in our analysis. 
 
3.3. Fund Characteristics 
Mutual fund and ETF performance can be shown to be influenced by several fund 
characteristics. Characteristics that have been shown in previous literature to influence returns 
for ETFs and index mutual funds are expense ratio, size (total net assets), risk (standard 
deviation), turnover, and fund flow. For this study, size is not considered a factor for the analyses 
                                                 
3 Also, using European iShares, Simon and Sternberg (2005) find significant overreaction to after hours 
developments. So much so that one can derive a profitable trading strategy based upon buying or shorting iShares at 
the close of U.S. trading, if the discount or premium to NAV is sufficiently large. 
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that compare funds with indexes since indexes themselves are not tradable, and therefore, have 
no net asset value with which to compare. 
 
The literature surrounding the importance of expense ratios on mutual fund performance 
shows a consensus that mutual fund expense ratios matter when determining their performance. 
This is probably the only factor that is almost universally agreed upon to affect fund 
performance. For example, Malhotra and McLeod (1997) shows that funds with lower 
management fees and expenses increase returns.4 Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) not only 
establishes that low expense funds outperform high expense funds, but that this observation 
holds even when comparing load funds with low expenses with no-load funds with high annual 
expenses.5 Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) show that mutual fund returns are 
affected most directly by expenses and transaction costs. They determine that expenses have a 
negative impact on performance that is at least proportionate to the level of the expense ratio. 
This is consistent with Shula (2004) who shows that returns achieved by actively managed funds 
are not significant enough to compensate for the increase in expense ratio. Fabozzi et al. (1991) 
conclude that any improved ability demonstrated by managers in forecasting fund performance is 
negated by operating expenses and transaction costs. This suggests that an investor who does not 
have the ability to do the extensive research to find the best fund managers can simply look for 
funds with low expenses to receive returns that are comparable. Dellva and Olson (1998) concur 
with this assessment by stating that funds with superior performance tend to have lower expense 
ratios. 
 
                                                 
4 Walker (1997) confirms this result. 
5 Hooks (1996) confirms this conclusion. 
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There is one study that shows that higher expense ratios have a purpose. Droms and 
Walker (1995) show that expense ratios are not predictive of fund performance by demonstrating 
that the funds that have higher returns typically take greater risks and have higher expense ratios. 
Grinblatt and Titman (1994) have an explanation for this result. They hypothesize that funds that 
do more research and trade the most may be exposing stocks that are underpriced. Golec (1996) 
suggests that higher expense ratios may be a signal that management has superior investment 
skills. The implication is that these skills should lead to greater fund performance. However, as 
shown in literature, the empirical evidence shows that higher expense ratios do not lead to 
greater performance. 
 
The effect of fund size is a bit unclear. Droms and Walker (1995) show that smaller funds 
outperform larger funds, on average. They also find that these smaller funds invest in riskier 
assets, so it is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the improved performance is due to the size or 
the risk.6 Grinblatt and Titman (1994) present evidence that mutual fund size and performance 
are unrelated. They explain that it is not possible to attain superior performance by investing in a 
fund based upon its total net assets. Curcio et al. (2003) find that for mutual funds, firm size has 
a positive and significant relationship, and book-to-market has a negative and significant 
relationship to fund returns. This is contradictory evidence to the efficient markets hypothesis 
proposed by Fama and French (1992) and supported by much asset pricing literature. Curcio et 
al. show that for out-of-sample mutual fund data, the Fama/French factors are not consistent at 
explaining returns. 
 
                                                 
6 Several studies, including those by Malhotra and Mcleod (1997) and Markese (2000) show that larger funds 
typically produce higher returns. Of course, there are also studies that show that fund size is not a determining factor 
at all in mutual fund performance. 
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According to both theory and empirical evidence from noted researchers like Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992), more risk provides higher expected returns.7 
Droms and Walker (1995) use the standard deviation of annual total returns for equity funds to 
proxy for risk. They show that risk is the most highly correlated determining factor in equity 
mutual fund performance.8 
 
The turnover ratio of a mutual fund is usually computed by taking a fund’s purchases or 
sales and dividing by the fund’s average total net assets. A lower number implies a buy-and-hold 
strategy by the fund and usually means lower trading costs which should translate into a higher 
return. Also, the high turnover ratios usually result in higher expenses and lower performance 
due to transactions costs. Malhotra and McLeod (1997) show that lower turnover is associated 
with greater fund performance. This is in contrast to the results achieved by Droms and Walker 
(1995), who find turnover is unable to predict increased performance over any specified period. 
Droms and Walker’s result may have been a product of the way they sorted their database, 
though. They parceled out 10 portfolios based upon the standard deviation of the mean return 
rather than by fund objective, the more common method of creating mutual fund portfolios. It 
seems more likely that funds with aggressive objectives may have significantly different turnover 
ratios than funds with more conservative objectives, for example. 
 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) study the flow of funds into and out of mutual funds. They find 
that search costs are a significant factor in determining fund flows. The fund flows are related to 
the media attention that the funds are getting and the size of the family of funds, factors which 
                                                 
7 More recently, Markese (1999) comes to the same conclusion. 
8 Barber (1994) also uses historical standard deviation (of monthly mutual fund returns) to measure unsystematic 
mutual fund risk. 
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both can lower search costs for individual investors. They also find that investors seem to favor 
funds that have been doing well in the recent past, and that funds with high marketing costs have 
a stronger relationship between performance and flow of funds. 
 
3.4. Tracking Error 
Several authors look at improving (reducing) tracking error through active trading 
strategies. Jorion (2003) and El-Hassan and Kofman (2003) look at active portfolio allocation 
strategies that exploit the predictability in the conditional variance-covariance matrix of asset 
returns by deriving a constrained tracking-error efficient frontier.9 Then, they use the variance-
covariance matrix to rebalance their portfolios to minimize tracking error. In theory, these 
techniques seem efficient in reducing tracking error. However, in practice, since trades are made 
dynamically, implementing the strategies would seriously increase the trading volume and 
turnover ratio in a mutual fund portfolio, thereby increasing trading costs substantially. 
 
Frino and Gallagher (2001) empirically study index fund tracking error. They explain that 
the primary factor that causes index fund tracking error is the cost of transactions which includes 
liquidity concerns, fund cash flows, dividends, volatility of the benchmark, corporate activity, 
and index composition changes. They find that the tracking error associated with the S&P 500 
index funds follows a quarterly (seasonal) pattern. The tracking error is lowest at the end of each 
calendar quarter. They surmise that this seasonal effect may be the result of the timing of 
                                                 
9 Burmeister et al. (2005) develop diagnostic tools to evaluate alternative active trading strategies for reducing 
tracking error. 
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dividend payments by the funds. Other reasons for tracking error, they conclude, may have to do 
with the changes in the index itself.10 
 
4. Analyses and Models 
The analyses and models are grouped such that the first set deals directly with 
performance differences between ETFs and index mutual funds and reasons for these 
differences. The second section of analyses addresses the important issue of tracking error. 
 
4.1. ETF Performance Differences with Index Mutual Funds 
Analysis 1: Comparing abnormal returns of exchange-traded funds and mutual funds. 
Although they do not specifically compare abnormal returns, Poterba and Shoven (2002) 
compare total returns of Spiders and the Vanguard Index 500. They show that the Vanguard 
index mutual fund performed slightly better during the period from 1994 to 2000. Also, Dellva 
(2001) compares these two funds with the iShares S&P 500 to test which is the best investment. 
He includes expenses, management fees, and tax considerations in determining his results over 
one to 15-year time horizons. He concludes that ETFs have advantages over longer holding 
periods and when larger lump-sum investments are made. Neither study does any kind of 
regression analysis. Both of these comparisons demonstrate a need for further examination on the 
topic. 
 
To test whether or not ETFs and index mutual funds have insignificantly different 
abnormal returns, first, we test whether the difference between ETF returns and index fund 
                                                 
10 Agapova (2006) also examines tracking error by comparing the tracking error of several ETFs and index mutual 
funds relative to their indexes. She concludes that ETFs have smaller tracking errors and lower expenses. 
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returns is significantly different using individual comparison tests. We perform Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests to examine the data for a normal distribution. Since essentially 
none of the indexes are normally distributed, we run the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
Test on each pair in the data. We test all combinations of index funds and ETFs that follow the 
same index. If we find a significant result for this test, it will tell us that the pair of funds (or an 
index and a fund) being tested have different median returns. 
 
The second test of abnormal returns we use is to run OLS regressions of the ETF and 
index fund returns against the returns of the index that each is tracking. The only independent 
variable in these equations is the index that the fund is tracking.  
ETFtETFETFt INDEXETFRet εβα ++=    (1) 
IFUNDtIFUNDIFUNDt INDEXIFRet εβα ++=   (2) 
 
To determine whether the ETF and index fund abnormal returns are significantly 
different from each other, we then simultaneously run two regressions at a time using a 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model and subtract the ETF alpha from the index fund 
alpha to test whether there are significant differences in the abnormal returns of the paired 
equations. This test was done for each pair of ETFs and index funds that follow the same index. 
If we find a significantly positive result, then we can say for that pair of funds, the index fund 
performs better than the ETF. 
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We then perform a third test, a panel regression on all index funds and ETFs, to see 
whether ETF returns are significantly different from index fund returns: 
tpptptp ETF ,,, INDEXReturn εχβα +++=    (3) 
where ETF is a dummy variable that does not vary with time. ETF is equal to one if the fund is 
an ETF and zero if an index fund. If the dummy coefficient, χ , is significant, then, as a group, 
index funds and ETFs have significantly different abnormal returns. 
 
Equation (1) also shows something interesting when comparing ETFs that track the same 
index. There are two cases (shown below) where different ETFs track the same index: 
 
ETF     INDEX TRACKED ETF ORGANIZATION                . 
SPY (SPDRs - Spiders)   S&P 500  Unit Investment Trust 
iShares S&P 500 Index (IVV)  S&P 500  Open-End Investment Company 
MDY (MidCap Spiders)   S&P Midcap 400  Unit Investment Trust 
iShares S&P MidCap 400 Index (IJH) S&P Midcap 400  Open-End Investment Company 
 
Analysis 2: Testing ETFs that track the same index. 
The Standard & Poor’s ETFs were set up as unit investment trusts and are larger and 
more popular (more trading volume) than the ones set up as open-end investment companies 
(mutual funds). The S&P ETFs are also at least five years older, and therefore, more established 
than the iShares funds which have only been available since May 2000. Again, to test the 
abnormal returns, we run OLS regressions of the respective ETF returns against the returns of the 
index each is tracking. To determine whether the ETF and index fund abnormal returns are 
significantly different from each other, we again simultaneously run regressions with the SUR 
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model and test whether there are significant differences in the alpha terms in the paired 
equations. If there is a significant difference, it will tell us which ETF outperforms the other. 
 
Analysis 3: Determinants of abnormal returns in ETFs and index funds. 
To investigate the determinants of the portfolio’s alpha, we run the following regression 
on alpha to determine if these factors are important in determining the abnormal returns of index 
funds and ETFs: 
i
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where αˆ  is the alpha on the portfolio as determined in equations (1) and (2), C  is a linear 
constant, γ  is a slope coefficient, V are the variables related to the fund from j = 1 to n (see 
below), ω  is an adjustment for the constant term given the fund is an ETF, D  is a dummy that 
is equal to one if the fund is an ETF and zero if the fund is an index mutual fund, and λ is a 
slope adjustment given the fund is an ETF. Some of the variables (V) used are inception date, 
expense ratio, size (total net assets), portfolio risk (standard deviation), turnover ratio, and 
whether the fund is a no-load fund. Most index funds are no-load funds, so the no-load variable 
is introduced as a dummy to capture the few index funds that are not no-load. These variables are 
used because they have been shown in prior literature to affect abnormal returns of mutual funds.  
 
We also use a dummy signifying whether the index fund is a true index fund or not and 
the relative size (by net assets) of the fund to all funds following the same index. True index 
funds are defined here to be the index funds that attempt to track the given index by maintaining 
positions in the assets within the index and trying to replicate the performance of the portfolio on 
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a nearly one-to-one basis. In other words, the relative beta should be very close to one to be 
considered a true index fund. Index funds that follow an index, but actively target a beta of 2.0 
would not be considered a true index fund, for example; nor would a fund that sells the index 
portfolio short, effectively targeting a beta of –1.0. There are twenty such index funds in our 
sample. We list them separately as “other index funds.” ETFs are all considered true index funds. 
Relative size is tested to see if fund level market concentration is a factor in determining 
abnormal returns. All factors described thus far are fund-related and as such, the managers of the 
funds may have some control over them. If the coefficients on (for example) expense ratio and 
turnover are negative and significant, then they inversely impact abnormal returns.11 In this case, 
the manager would want to minimize expenses and turnover to allow the fund to achieve the 
highest possible return for investors. 
 
We also introduce two index-specific variables are used that do not change from fund to 
fund. They are the number of funds following an index, and the Herfindahl index using the 
assumption that all funds following the same index constitute an industry. These are introduced 
to see if the concentration of the industry (funds following an index) has an effect on abnormal 
returns. We assume that the fund manager has no control over this factor. 
 
4.2. Tracking Error 
Many studies examining ETFs and index funds make a point of determining each fund’s 
tracking error. When reading the literature, one might wonder why investors would care about 
tracking error. One reason to look at tracking error is because investors use ETFs to change 
                                                 
11 Commissions are not included because they typically are fixed and mainly vary by broker rather than strictly by 
shares or dollars transacted. 
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equity positions quickly. For example, hedge funds use ETFs frequently. Tracking errors are also 
important to arbitrageurs, who could profit from misalignment of fund prices and the underlying 
index. By observing ETFs, we may be able to gauge what hedge funds are doing in a real time 
basis. If ETFs show a poor tracking ability, they would be less useful for hedge funds. Therefore, 
we analyze ETFs and index funds to compare their abilities to track the indexes they follow. 
 
Analysis 4: Comparison of ETF and index mutual fund tracking errors. 
When analyzing the tracking error of ETFs and index funds, we look at the funds in a 
manner similar to that used by Frino and Gallagher (2001). Using 42 index funds that track the 
S&P 500, Frino and Gallagher calculate tracking error (TE) in three ways. We will use the same 
notation they use. 
 
In the first method, we derive tracking error by using the absolute value of the difference 
in returns of the ETF or index fund and the benchmark index (ept = Rpt – Rbt), starting on day t, 
where the daily average absolute tracking error over n days (TE1,p) is: 
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A second test for tracking error compares the variability (standard deviation) of the 
difference in the ETF or index portfolio returns and the underlying index return (TE2,p). This 
method may be calculated as: 
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The third method used for tracking error is to estimate the standard error of the residuals 
of a regression on returns (TE3,p). The model is simply the same as models (1) and (2). This 
method is useful because when regressing the return of the ETF or index portfolio on the return 
of the underlying index, the standard error of the regression equation provides a general estimate 
of tracking error. Pope and Yadav (1994) explain, however, that if the beta of this regression is 
not exactly equal to one, the regression residuals will be biased, and therefore, differ from TE2,p. 
These authors show that due to negative serial correlation, tracking error will be overstated if the 
portfolio does not have a beta of exactly 1.0 against the benchmark portfolio. Negative serial 
correlation is especially a problem when using higher frequency data such as daily or weekly 
returns. However, the emphasis of this study is the difference in the tracking errors between the 
two types of fund. So, since there is no evidence that these measurement problems are more 
serious for one type of fund, we do not expect that the negative serial correlation will lead to 
biased conclusions. 
 
Hypothesis: Tracking error has an inverse relationship with fund flows 
After calculating tracking error, we regressed lagged tracking errors on fund flows of 
ETFs and index funds to determine if the tracking error affects fund flows. The purpose of this 
test is to gauge the importance of tracking errors to investors. If investors view tracking errors as 
important for trading, they will move money in and out these funds based upon tracking errors. 
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where tFF  is fund flow at time t; τκψ ,, and θ  are parameters; TE  is the tracking error 
variable at time t–s, where s = 1, 2; and n is the superscript denoting each method of calculating 
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tracking error. There are three dummy variables for this regression. 1δ  is a dummy that equals 
one if the fund is an ETF and zero if an index fund; 2δ  is a dummy that equals one if the fund is 
an international fund and zero if it is not an international fund; and, 3δ  is a dummy that equals 
one if the fund is a true index fund and zero if it is not a true index fund. We use the second 
dummy because there is some evidence that international funds are less liquid and less well 
priced (Engle and Sarkar, 2002). Therefore, the tracking errors of international funds are higher 
than domestic funds. The third dummy is used because of the large differences found in index 
funds that do not track their indexes targeting a beta of 1.0. We look at one and two lagged 
periods for tracking error to see if past tracking error affects fund flows further away in time. If 
pκ  is significant, then past tracking error affects current fund flows. Our a priori expectation is 
that pκ  will be negative and significant, which means if tracking error is large, fund flows will 
decrease by more than if tracking error is small. Since fund flow is significantly impacted by 
hedging and arbitraging activities, the significance of κ  also would indirectly suggest that 
tracking error is important to participants in these activities. The pκ  obtained from the differing 
tracking error methods should be very similar. We also expect the intercept term, pt ,ψ , to be 
positive and significant implying the flow of funds is typically positive into both ETFs and index 
mutual funds. Also given the popularity of ETFs, they are generally growing at a faster pace.12 
So, the intercept may be greater for ETFs than for mutual funds. 
 
                                                 
12 Agapova (2006) finds that flows into ETFs were positive and substantially higher than flows into index mutual 
funds. 
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5. Data 
 
The data in this paper come from various sources. General ETF data except for prices and 
returns come from “Mutual Funds: The Individual Investor’s Guide to Exchange-Traded Funds 
2005” which is an annual article in the trade journal sponsored by The American Association of 
Individual Investors. ETF daily prices, returns and other supplemental ETF data are from Yahoo 
Finance. 
 
Index mutual fund data except for prices and returns come from Morningstar Principia 
Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. From this CD, we obtained all of the 
data for the index fund characteristics such as net asset value (size), turnover and expense ratio. 
Daily index fund prices and returns are from Yahoo Finance. 
 
Calvert, Morningstar Indexes, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), and Yahoo 
Finance provided index values. Funds less than two years old on June 30, 2006 are excluded 
from the data set because two years is the minimum amount of data required to determine the 
annual fund flows. As much as possible, ETFs are matched with index funds following the same 
index. Fund flow data are annual and are obtained directly from fund prospectuses. 
 
The final data set includes 177 index funds and 72 ETFs that follow 78 indexes. Of these, 
there are 25 indexes that have at least one index fund and one ETF that follow it (several have 
multiple index funds following the index). A total of 27 funds, two index funds and 25 ETFs, are 
international funds, and 20 index funds were not classified as “true index funds.” 
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6. Empircal Results 
 
In order to determine whether parametric or nonparametric tests were appropriate for our 
paired comparison tests, we first perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests to 
determine whether each (or any) of the indexes follow a normal distribution. In seven out of the 
78 indexes, a normal distribution could not be ruled out. All indexes for which we were unable to 
rule out a normal distribution have existed for less than three years. 
 
Because the indexes do not follow a normal distribution, a paired t-test to determine 
whether index funds and ETFs have similar distributions to their respective indexes is not 
entirely appropriate. Therefore we performed a nonparametric test, the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks 
Test, on the daily returns for each of the following pair-types following the same index: 
index/index fund, index/ETF and index fund/ETF. A test with a significant p-value indicates the 
differences in the median returns of the pairs are significantly different. In other words, the 
index, index fund or ETF does a poor job of reproducing the same median return as its 
counterpart. 
 
Looking at the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test results in Table 1.2, it is apparent that a 
large number of index funds do not produce the same median return as their indexes (58% of the 
funds had significant p-values at the 10% level or lower). We also note that of the 102 
statistically significant comparisons, the index outperforms the index fund 87% of the time. This 
result is expected since expenses reduce the funds’ returns. However, when examining the other 
three panels, we find only a small number of other pair-types do a poor job of reproducing the 
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Table 1.2. Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Tests 
Panel A. Index to Index Fund     
n = 177       
P-level 
Significance Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent   
1% 78 44.07% 78 44.07%   
5% 11 6.21% 89 50.28%   
10% 13 7.34% 102 57.63%   
       
       
Panel B. Index to ETF      
n = 72       
P-level 
Significance Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent   
1% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%   
5% 2 2.78% 2 2.78%   
10% 3 4.17% 5 6.94%   
       
       
Panel C. ETF to Index Fund (Following same index)    
n = 256       
P-level 
Significance Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent   
1% 1 0.39% 1 0.39%   
5% 2 0.78% 3 1.17%   
10% 1 0.39% 4 1.56%   
       
       
Panel D. ETF to ETF (Following same index)    
n = 2       
P-level 
Significance Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent   
1% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%   
5% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%   
10% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%   
       
We perform a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test on 507 combinations of indexes, index funds, 
and ETFs. Each panel above illustrates a specific pair-type. The column "Frequency" 
illustrates the number of tests of that pair-type that fall between the specified 
significance levels (i.e. for Panel A, 11 pairs have significance levels (p-values) falling 
between 1% and 5%). 
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returns of their paired asset. We expected ETF-index fund and ETF-ETF pair-types to match 
fairly closely because both ETFs and index funds have both been shown to underperform their 
benchmarks1 so ETFs and index funds should (or at least could) have very similar median 
returns, but continue to underperform relative to the index. However, the most unexpected result 
from this test is the Index-ETF test comparisons. These test results suggest ETFs do produce the 
same median returns as their indexes. Only 7% of these comparisons are significant at the 10% 
level or below and none is significant at the 1% level. 
 
We summarize the results from the individual OLS regressions on index funds and ETFs 
in Table 1.3. We find that the alphas (abnormal returns) are very small using our daily data. 
There are 256 index-fund-ETF pairs in our sample that each follow the same index.  Descriptive 
results from the regressions are shown in Panel A. The range of differences in alphas is between 
+0.0321% and –0.0245% per day. Only nine of the 256 pairs have differences in alphas which 
are statistically significant. These are individually listed in Panel B of the table. Even though the 
results were generally insignificant, there some results from these regressions that are 
noteworthy. First, out of the 256 comparisons, the abnormal returns associated with the ETFs are 
higher than the alphas of the index funds in 214 cases, which represents 83.6% of all cases. This 
result is in contrast to previous results that conclude that index funds tend to have higher alphas 
than ETFs. This result may be due to ETF managers reducing their costs by timing their 
modifications to the fund in order to minimize transactions costs, especially in funds that follow 
the S&P 500. The results are much more prevalent in funds that follow the S&P 500 than funds 
that do not. About 86% of S&P 500 funds have higher performing ETFs, while only about 30%
                                                 
1 See Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004) for index funds; Gastineau (2004) and Engle and Sarkar (2002) for ETFs. 
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Table 1.3. Index Fund and ETF Abnormal Return Comparisons (Individual Regressions) 
Panel A.        
 Statistic Alpha (E) Alpha (I) 
Alpha (I) - 
Alpha (E) 
P-Value for 
Difference   
 Mean 0.0054% 0.0023% -0.0031% 0.0000   
 Median 0.0061% 0.0033% -0.0023%    
 Maximum 0.0242% 0.0367% 0.0321%    
 Minimum -0.0037% -0.0250% -0.0245%    
 Standard Dev. 3.164E-05 6.785E-05 6.528E-05    
     
        
Panel B.        
 Index ETF Alpha (E) 
Index 
Fund 
True 
Index = 1 Alpha (I) 
Alpha (I) - 
Alpha (E) p-value 
 DJIA DIA 9.23E-05 RYCVX 0 -4.57E-05 -1.38E-04 0.01864
 DJIA DIA 7.89E-05 PDOWX 0 -5.35E-05 -1.32E-04 0.02317
 S&P 500 IVV 6.63E-05 VADBX 1 0.0003668 3.01E-04 0.00417
 S&P 500 IVV 6.63E-05 ULPIX 0 -9.81E-05 -1.64E-04 0.00795
 S&P 500 IVV 6.42E-05 RYTNX 0 -0.0001349 -1.99E-04 0.01699
 S&P 500 IVV 6.63E-05 BLPIX 1 -4.98E-05 -1.16E-04 0.05472
 S&P 500 SPY 6.22E-05 ULPIX 0 -0.0001464 -2.09E-04 0.00169
 S&P 500 SPY 6.25E-05 RYTNX 0 -0.0001349 -1.97E-04 0.02918
 S&P 500 SPY 5.97E-05 BLPIX 1 -5.95E-05 -1.19E-04 0.06461
256 ETF-Index Fund pairs were regressed using ETFtETFETFt INDEXETFRet εβα ++=  or 
IFUNDtIFUNDIFUNDt INDEXIFRet εβα ++=  then the alphas were compared using a SUR analysis. 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for these comparisons. Alpha (E) is the abnormal return on 
the ETF, and Alpha (I) is the abnormal return for the index fund. The fourth column shows the 
descriptives of the differences between the abnormal returns on the index fund and ETF. Panel B 
shows all nine pairs that have a significant difference.  
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of ETFs that follow other indexes outperform their index fund counterparts. This result is not 
altogether unexpected since S&P 500 funds are generally more scrutinized than other funds. 
Another result of note from this table is that of the nine significant results, only three indexes 
were involved and most of the significant results were between ETFs and index funds that were 
not classified as “true” index funds. Overall, this table suggests that individually, index funds 
typically do not significantly differ in performance with their ETF counterparts. However, as a 
group, the mean abnormal return for ETFs is statistically significantly higher than that of index 
funds. 
 
After analyzing the individual regressions in Table 1.3, Table 1.4 shows the results of the 
pooled regressions. All returns from index funds and ETFs were pooled along with their 
respective indexes. A dummy was added to the equation to extract the differences between index 
funds and ETFs as shown in equation (3). The results show that when all returns are regressed 
against their respective index returns, the ETF dummy is weakly significant. So, to delve into the 
reason for the significant results, we included three more regressions. When international funds 
are removed, the significance disappears, but when only true index funds and ETFs are 
regressed, the ETF dummy increases its significance. As mentioned earlier, true funds are ones 
that attempt to track the given index by maintaining positions in the assets within the index and 
trying to replicate the performance of the portfolio on a one-to-one basis. All ETFs fall into this 
category, as do all but 20 index funds. In the last regression in this table, when both international 
funds and non-true index funds are excluded, the ETF dummy is no longer significant. 
Essentially, this table is confirming results from the previous table, the index funds that were
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Table 1.4. Index Fund and ETF Abnormal Return Comparisons (Pooled Regressions) 
 
Variable All Funds Domestic Funds True Funds 
Domestic & 
True Funds 
Alpha 6.91E-05 *** 6.91E-05 *** 5.68E-05 *** 5.40E-05 *** 
 1.86E-05  1.86E-05  1.10E-05  9.70E-06  
Return on Index 0.80296 *** 0.80013 *** 0.89984 *** 0.9078 *** 
 1.32E-03  1.38E-03  7.88E-04  7.34E-04  
ETF Dummy 7.29E-05 * 1.79E-05  4.63E-05 ** 1.97E-06  
 4.06E-05  4.89E-05  2.30E-05  2.44E-05  
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.48659 0.48267 0.78364 0.82324 
 
Pooled regressions were performed on all index funds and ETFs using the equation, tpptptp ETFINDEXReturn ,,, εβα +++= . The 
first regression shows the results of all 249 index funds and ETFs. The other regressions apply the same equation but remove the 27 
international funds in the second regression, remove the 20 funds that are not classified as true index funds in the third regression, and 
remove both the international funds and the funds that are not classified as true index funds in the last regression. Standard errors are 
below the coefficients. *, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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categorized as not being true index funds seem to be driving the differences between ETFs and 
index funds. So, index funds which target an exact replication of their index’s performance do 
not significantly differ in performance with their ETF counterparts. It is also noteworthy that the 
ETF dummy is always positive, again confirming the findings in the previous table. 
 
Next, we look at the elements that may affect the abnormal returns. The factors that we 
include as possible determinants are inception date, expense ratio, net assets, standard deviation, 
turnover, and whether or not the fund is a no load fund. These variables are used because they 
have been shown in prior literature to affect abnormal returns of mutual funds. We also include 
as possible factors that influence abnormal returns are whether the fund is a true index fund 
(dummy), and the relative size of the fund when compared to all funds following the same index. 
For this variable, if a fund is the only fund following a given index, its relative size under this 
measure would be 100%. We also use two index-specific variables that do not change from fund 
to fund. First is the number of funds following an index, and the second is the Herfindahl index 
using the assumption that all funds following the same index constitute an industry. If only one 
fund follows a given index, its Herfindahl index would be 10,000. We include these factors to 
see if fund-level or industry-level concentration is important in determining the abnormal return 
of the funds. 
 
Some variables are relatively highly correlated with other variables. The correlations 
between the independent variables are shown in Table 1.5. Some of the very high correlations 
are expected. For example, RelSize (relative size), FundsIdx (funds following an index), and 
HerfIdx (Herfindahl index) are all trying to capture the same idea, specifically, how the 
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Table 1.5. Alpha Components Correlation Matrix 
Variable Alpha ETFDum Incept ExpRatio NetAssets SDev Turnover 
ETFDum 0.2332 ***             
Incept 0.0018  0.2720 ***           
ExpRatio 0.1461 ** -0.2714 *** 0.0968          
NetAssets -0.0283  0.1133 * -0.3250 *** -0.2057 ***       
SDev 0.2119 *** -0.0681  -0.0152  0.4747 *** -0.0525      
Turnover 0.1019  -0.1560 ** 0.0762  0.4368 *** -0.0787  0.3984 ***   
NL -0.0094  0.2131 *** 0.0855  -0.3376 *** 0.0904  0.0335  0.0747  
TrueIndex -0.1478 ** 0.1885 *** -0.1128 * -0.6463 *** 0.0823  -0.6111 *** -0.5922 *** 
RelSize 0.2919 *** 0.7781 *** 0.1001  -0.2186 *** 0.1141 * -0.0287  -0.1558 ** 
FundsIdx -0.2658 *** -0.4778 *** -0.3469 *** -0.0250  0.0948  -0.1060 * 0.0494  
HerfIdx 0.2369 *** 0.6044 *** 0.3121 *** 0.0264  -0.0614  0.1702 *** -0.0239  
 
Alpha Components Correlation Matrix Continued 
Variable NL TrueIndex RelSize FundsIdx 
TrueIndex -0.0987        
RelSize 0.1430 ** 0.1765 ***     
FundsIdx -0.0922  0.0229  -0.5739 ***   
HerfIdx 0.1411 ** -0.0706  0.7201 *** -0.8415 *** 
 
Correlation coefficients are shown for each of the variables that is used in the determination of the components of alpha. ETFDum is a 
dummy equal to one if the fund is an ETF and zero if an index fund. Incept, ExpRatio, NetAssets, SDev, are the inception date (a 
higher number implies the fund is newer), the fund’s expense ratio, total net assets, and standard deviation of returns. Turnover, NL, 
TrueIndex, and RelSize are turnover as defined by the fund’s purchases divided by average total net assets for the year, dummy 
indicating whether the fund is a no-load fund or not, a dummy indicating whether the fund is attempting to match its index with a beta 
of 1.0 (true index) or some other beta, and the size of the fund relative to other funds following the same index. FundsIdx and HerfIdx 
are the same for all funds that follow a single index. FundsIdx indicates the number of funds following the index, while HerfIdx is the 
Herfindahl index assuming all funds following a single index represent an industry. All annual values are calculated as of June 30, 
2006. *, **, *** represent correlations that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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concentration of the market affects abnormal return. The ETF dummy is correlated with all three 
of these variables since ETFs generally have higher concentration percentages than index funds 
in our sample. This higher concentration may be attributed to the fact that usually only one ETF 
follows a given index whereas often several mutual funds will follow the index. So all money 
going into ETFs following an index gets funneled into a single fund, but there are several choices 
for money going into index funds. The inception date is also well correlated with FndsIdx and 
HerfIdx, suggesting that indexes with newer funds following it tend to have a smaller number of 
funds, and higher concentration among funds following the index. TrueIndex, the dummy 
variable that describes whether or not the fund was a true index fund or not, is highly correlated 
with expense ratio, standard deviation, and turnover, implying that funds targeting a beta of 1.0 
with their indexes have lower expenses, lower standard deviation, and lower turnover, all of 
which one would expect since the other funds all target absolute betas higher than 1.0 (i.e. higher 
than 1.0 or lower than –1.0) and usually have higher volatility in their returns. The most difficult 
correlation to understand is that expense ratio is positively correlated with abnormal returns at 
the 5% significance level. This implies that higher expenses are correlated with higher abnormal 
returns, which is counter-intuitive. However, when one realizes that some of the correlations may 
be driven by the funds that are not true index funds, this correlation makes more sense. The 
funds not classified as true index funds have alphas approximately 73% higher than true index 
funds. Other unusual differences are expense ratio, net assets, standard deviation, and turnover, 
which are much different than true index funds. Expense ratios are more than three times higher; 
net assets are (on average) less than one-tenth, standard deviation is more than double, and 
turnover is more than 13 times higher than true index funds. When removing these funds, the 
abnormal return and expense ratio are no longer significantly correlated. 
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Table 1.6 illustrates the results of these regressions using equation (4). Two variables, the 
no load dummy (NL) and the true index dummy (TrueIndex) were not multiplied by the ETF 
dummy and included in the regressions since they are only applicable to index funds. For this 
table, each of the factors is listed on the left and seven regressions are shown that include the 
standard variables found in prior literature to be important determinants of abnormal return along 
with other variables that were considered for inclusion in the regression described above. All 
combinations were tested. However, only the most relevant are shown due to space 
considerations. Each of the four variables, TrueIndex, RelSize, FundsIdx, and HerfIdx were 
included one at time to be sure that they added something to the regression. TrueIndex made the 
regression worse. In all cases, including TrueIndex reduced the adjusted R-squared. Therefore, it 
was not considered for the final equation. Since FundsIdx, and HerfIdx are highly correlated and 
are included for the same purpose, to measure the industry concentration, we only want to 
include one of them in a final regression. RelSize is highly correlated with these two variables as 
well, but it is a fund-specific variable, while FundsIdx and HerfIdx are industry-specific, so it 
was still considered in regressions that also include either FundsIdx or HerfIdx. 
 
The Herfindahl index always helped our regressions slightly more than the number of 
funds following an index. So, we conclude the best regression is in the last column of Table 1.6. 
Therefore, we find the ETF dummy is significant in determining abnormal return suggesting 
ETFs have a significantly higher abnormal return than index funds for our sample. Also, for 
index funds, the relative size and Herfindahl index are significant determinants, while for ETFs, 
the inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and relative size are all important 
determinants of abnormal return. These findings suggest that managers may be able to improve 
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Table 1.6. Regressions of Alpha Components 
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Table 1.6. (Continued) 
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performance by reducing the expense ratios and standard deviations of their portfolios. If they 
have funds competing with them by tracking the same index, the fund managers may also 
consider limiting the total net assets allowed to be invested into the funds since funds with lower 
relative net assets tend to perform better than larger ones. 
 
Next, we begin our look at tracking error by analyzing the correlations of all 507 pair-
types. The correlations are important to determine if there are any significant differences in the 
funds that should be accounted for in later analyses. We chose the Spearman correlation since the 
data is not normally distributed. Table 1.7 shows the results of the Spearman correlations. The 
primary finding is that almost all funds that are not following international indexes have very 
high correlations with their indexes. Over 98% of the pairs have absolute correlations higher than 
90%. In fact, almost one-quarter of the pairs have correlations above 99%. We are not surprised 
that most funds have a high correlation with the index that the fund is following. After all, 
having a high correlation with the index is often the primary goal of the ETF or index fund. The 
high Spearman correlations suggest most of the funds track their indexes well and are well-
correlated with other funds tracking the same index. 
 
Index funds and ETFs following international indexes reveal quite a different story, 
though. None of these funds is correlated with its index at the 95% level, and most are only 
correlated between 50% and 70% with their indexes. Only one international pair, the MSCI 
Pacific Excluding Japan (index) and iShares MSCI Pacific Ex-Japan Index Fund (ETF), had a 
lower correlation than 50%. This result may be due to the previous finding that country funds 
tend to be more correlated with domestic stock indexes in the short run, while being more 
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Table 1.7. Spearman Correlations 
Panel A. All Pair-Types Excluding International Funds   
n = 477      
Minimum Absolute 
Correlation Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
99% 115 24.06% 115 24.11%  
95% 313 65.48% 428 89.73%  
90% 41 8.58% 469 98.32%  
85% 5 1.05% 474 99.37%  
<85% 3 0.63% 477 100.00%  
      
      
Panel B. International Funds    
n = 30      
Minimum Absolute 
Correlation Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
95% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%  
90% 2 6.90% 2 6.67%  
80% 1 3.45% 3 10.00%  
70% 13 44.83% 16 53.33%  
60% 7 24.14% 23 76.67%  
50% 5 17.24% 28 93.33%  
<50% 2 3.45% 30 100.00%
      
We perform a Spearman Correlation test on 507 combinations of indexes, index funds, and 
ETFs. Panel A combines all pair-type correlations except Indexes with international funds 
(both index funds and ETFs). The column "Frequency" shows the number of tests falling 
between the specified significance levels (i.e. for Panel A, 313 pairs have correlations 
between 95% and 99%). 
 
 
correlated with the respective foreign index in the long run (see Chiang and Kim, 2003). In 
general, from the correlations we find that we must account for international funds separately to 
be sure that their poor correlations do not affect our results in an unforeseen way. 
 
Table 1.8 shows some descriptive results for tracking error. Results are broken down into 
ETFs and Index Funds, and further into Domestic and International ETFs and “True Index 
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Table 1.8. Tracking Error 
 TE1 TE2 TE3   TE1 TE2 TE3 
ALL ETFS (72)  ALL INDEX FUNDS (177) 
Mean 0.425% 0.600% 0.583%  Mean 0.261% 0.430% 0.212%
Std. Dev. 0.306% 0.406% 0.392%  Std. Dev. 0.682% 0.937% 0.198%
Median 0.257% 0.391% 0.379%  Median 0.057% 0.169% 0.163%
Skewness 0.851 0.764 0.801  Skewness 4.711 4.913 3.480
         
DOMESTIC ETFS (46)  TRUE INDEX FUNDS (156) 
Mean 0.216% 0.331% 0.324%  Mean 0.075% 0.179% 0.176%
Std. Dev. 0.092% 0.158% 0.152%  Std. Dev. 0.080% 0.123% 0.115%
Median 0.187% 0.285% 0.277%  Median 0.053% 0.151% 0.150%
Skewness 1.987 1.938 1.865  Skewness 5.781 2.942 2.472
         
INTERNATIONAL ETFS (26)  OTHER INDEX FUNDS (21) 
Mean 0.793% 1.078% 1.042%  Mean 1.887% 2.627% 0.533%
Std. Dev. 0.172% 0.228% 0.228%  Std. Dev. 1.475% 2.089% 0.443%
Median 0.750% 1.011% 0.994%  Median 1.586% 2.301% 0.377%
Skewness 1.261 1.147 1.340  Skewness 1.265 1.355 1.033
 
Descriptive statistics for each of the tracking error methods are presented. ETFs and 
index funds are listed separately. ETFs are separated into domestic and 
international funds. Index funds are separated into “true index funds” and other 
index funds. A fund is excluded from the true index fund category if it does not 
attempt to exactly mimic the index that it is following. For example, Rydex funds 
were excluded because they are attempting to achieve a beta of +/- 2.0 relative to 
their respective indexes. 
Tracking error 1 (TE1) is calculated as 
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1 , and tracking error 3 (TE3) is the standard 
error of the regression that regresses the ETF or index fund on the index that the 
fund is attempting to follow. 
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Funds” and Other Index Funds. When examining the general results for ETFs and index funds, it 
appears that index funds are able to track their indexes much better than ETFs. After filtering out 
the international ETFs and the “other index funds,” the results show that domestic ETFs are 
much better at tracking their indexes than their international counterparts. In the same light, true 
index funds are significantly better at tracking their indexes than the other index funds. When 
comparing the domestic ETFs to the true index funds, the index funds still track the indexes 
better as a group. However, the index funds that were not true index funds were the worst group 
at tracking the index, even worse than the international ETFs. This table further confirms the 
differences in domestic and international funds as well as the differences in true index funds and 
other funds.  
 
In Table 1.9, results analyzing whether tracking error is a significant factor in the flow of 
funds for index funds and ETFs is presented. We show heteroskedasticity-consistent regressions 
for one- and two-period fund flows using each of the three different tracking error methods. 
There are a few notable results from these regressions. For one-period fund flows in Panel A, our 
a priori expectation that the constant is positive and significant is confirmed. This implies that 
there is a positive inflow of funds into index funds and ETFs irrespective of other factors. 
Another interesting result from this table is that tracking error does affect fund flow in the 
following period. Greater tracking error is associated with a decrease in fund flow during the 
following period, as we expected. The adjustment for ETFs is not significant, though. An 
additional finding from this table is that the third tracking error method, the standard error of the 
regressions, seems to be the weakest. We expected this as well because of the inclusion of funds 
in the regression that are not “true index funds.” As stated earlier, Pope and Yadav (1994) show
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Table 1.9. One- and Two-Period Fund Flows 
Panel A: First period fund flows      
  TE1 TE2 TE3 
 Psi (Constant) 1.274** 1.272** 0.585* 
  0.570 0.570  0.304
 Tracking Error -27.198* -21.028* 39.582  
  16.007 12.37  31.885
 ETF Dummy 0.398* 0.405* 0.401* 
  0.226 0.219  0.224
 ETF*Tracking Error -35.090  -16.798  -11.811  
  114.30 79.345  83.047
 INTL Dummy 0.593* 0.606* 0.614* 
  0.340 0.331  0.332
 INTL*Tracking Error -90.037  -72.060  -82.485  
  105.30 75.422  78.975
 True Index Dummy -1.086* -1.118* -0.434  
  0.572 0.572  0.308
 TRUE*Tracking Error 147.370** 107.540*** 51.914  
  59.475 40.631  52.195
        
 Adjusted R-squared 0.096  0.100  0.083  
 Number of observations: 691  691  713  
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Table 1.9. (continued) 
Panel B: Second period fund flows      
  TE1 TE2 TE3 
 Psi (Constant) 0.105  0.107  0.293  
  0.231 0.235  0.257
 Tracking Error 10.241  7.828  6.605  
  9.148 7.140  25.372
 ETF Dummy 0.101  0.076  0.119  
  0.242 0.208  0.189
 ETF*Tracking Error 125.370  119.580* 112.750* 
  103.34 66.998  60.897
 INTL Dummy 1.015*** 1.010*** 0.774** 
  0.383 0.357  0.326
 INTL*Tracking Error -173.880* -126.440* -96.639  
  103.68 68.596  61.881
 True Index Dummy 0.003  0.034  -0.148  
  0.232 0.237  0.259
 TRUE*Tracking Error 23.025  -12.970  -14.526  
  27.581 16.020  29.351
        
 Adjusted R-squared 0.268  0.270  0.246  
 Number of observations: 449  449  472  
        
One- and two-period fund flows were regressed on each type of tracking error with the regression: 
∑ ∑
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where tFF  is fund flow at time t; τκψ ,, and θ  are parameters; TE is the tracking error variable 
at time t–s, where s = 1 and 2; n is the subscript denoting each method of calculating tracking 
error; 1δ  is a dummy that equals one if the fund is an ETF and zero if an index fund; 2δ is a 
dummy that equals one if the fund is an international fund and zero if it is not an international 
fund; and 3δ  is a dummy that equals one if the fund is a true index fund and zero if it is not a true 
index fund. Standard errors are below the coefficients. *, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively. 
 
 
that this third tracking error method is biased, and therefore not reliable, unless the beta of the 
regression is exactly equal to one. The first two tracking error methods are nearly equal, with the 
second tracking error method yielding only slightly stronger results than the first method. 
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In Panel B of Table 1.9, a regression for the second year is performed to see if results 
carried over to the second year. Almost none of the results for the first year carry forward into 
the second year. The only significant result here is the importance of the international funds. The 
apparent suggestion of this result is that international funds have a significant reduction in fund 
flow in the second year due to greater tracking error. We can see no reasonable explanation for 
this other than that the result may have been due to an unknown unique characteristic of 
international funds. Investigation into this international phenomenon may be worth pursuing in a 
future study. So our conclusion from this table is that tracking error negatively affects fund flow 
in the following period, but is not a factor beyond one period. This result shows that investors 
pay attention to tracking error when deciding upon which investment to make. If funds are not 
very good at tracking the index that they are following, investors will put more money into other 
funds following the same index that track the index better. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Using daily data, we find that no indexes that have existed for more than three years have 
returns that follow a normal distribution. Therefore, we use the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-
Ranks Test and show that a large number of index funds do not reproduce the same median 
returns as their indexes. However, when ETFs are compared with their indexes, there are 
generally no significant differences. When we compare index funds to ETFs following the same 
index, we find no significant differences between the medians of the returns, suggesting that 
neither index funds nor ETFs can significantly outperform the other. 
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By regressing index funds and ETFs on the indexes that they follow, we find the 
abnormal returns are very small and virtually none were significant. However, the abnormal 
returns associated with the ETFs are higher than the alphas of the index funds in 83.6% of all 
cases. This result is confirmed by a pooled regression analysis and is in contrast to previous 
research which concludes that index funds tend to have higher alphas than ETFs. This new 
finding may be due to our use of a much broader array of ETF in this study while previous 
studies are much more limited in scope, generally examining one or two ETFs. We also note that 
the results are much more prevalent in funds that follow the S&P 500 than funds that do not. 
Only about 30% of ETFs that follow other indexes outperform their index fund counterparts. 
This finding may be the result of S&P 500 ETF managers improving their performance by 
timing their modifications to these ETF so that they minimize transactions costs, a way 
Gastineau (2004) says is common among index fund managers. Essentially, our results suggest 
that if an investor wants to track the S&P 500, he or she should invest in ETFs, but if investing to 
track another index, it would be better to invest in index funds. 
 
When looking at the components of abnormal returns, several regressions were 
performed. We find again that ETFs have higher abnormal returns than index funds. Other 
important factors for index funds include the relative size of a fund when compared with other 
funds following the same index and the Herfindahl index (given funds following a single index 
constitute an industry). For ETFs, the inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and 
relative size are all important determinants of abnormal return. These results suggest that 
managers may have some control over the performance of ETFs by (for example) reducing 
expenses and the standard deviation (risk) of their investments. However, it is not as simple for 
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managers of index funds. The factors that are important are related to the industry level market 
concentration of the funds following each index. To improve performance, index fund managers 
would need to be able to control not only their funds, but other funds that follow the same index. 
 
When examining the tracking errors for ETFs and index funds, we first perform 
Spearman correlations on each of the 507 pair-types. They show that almost all funds not 
following international indexes have very high correlations with their indexes. However, index 
funds and ETFs following international indexes are only correlated with their indexes between 
50% and 70% with their indexes. Also, we generally find index funds are able to track their 
indexes more closely than ETFs. After filtering out the international ETFs and the “other index 
funds,” the results show that domestic ETFs are much better at tracking their indexes than their 
international counterparts. Also, true index funds, defined as index funds that attempt to track 
their respective indexes by trying to replicate the performance of the index portfolios with a 
relative beta of one, are significantly better at tracking their indexes than the other index funds. 
When comparing the domestic ETFs to the true index funds, the index funds still track the 
indexes better as a group. However, the index funds that were not true index funds were the 
worst group at tracking the index, even worse than the international ETFs. These results inform 
us that when we are looking at fund flow in the next equation, we must account for international 
funds and funds that are not true index funds separately. 
 
Finally, we analyzed tracking error to see if it is a significant factor in the flow of funds 
for index funds and ETFs. We find that tracking error does affect fund flow for one period 
forward, but not two. As predicted, greater tracking error is associated with a decrease in fund 
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flow. Also we find that there is a positive inflow of funds into index funds and ETFs irrespective 
of other factors. An additional finding from this analysis is that the standard error of the 
regressions seems to be the weakest tracking error method. These results suggest that those who 
invest in index funds and ETFs monitor tracking error and invest in them based at least partially 
based upon the ability of the fund to closely track the index. The closer a fund tracks its index, 
the more likely the investor is to invest additional funds. 
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Chapter 2: Is Manager Gender Important in the Performance and 
Characteristics Mutual Funds? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
With recent advances in the understanding the psychology of investing, it is now 
commonly understood that different investors have different characteristics. Some systematic 
differences between male and female investors have been documented. These include that 
women tend to not have as much confidence as male investors, and women are generally more 
risk averse than men (see Barber and Odean (2001), Estes and Hosseini (1988), and Bajtelsmit 
and VanDerhei (1997) among others). 
 
If these behavioral phenomena found in individual investors apply to mutual fund 
managers, the implications are not insignificant. If women managers are more conservative 
investors, they should invest in stocks that are more conservative, and we should see women 
managing more conservative funds, such as value funds. In combination with being conservative, 
if women managers are less confident with their stock picks, they should have a lower turnover 
in their portfolios because they would be less confident about moving money into a new security, 
so their transaction fees would be lower. 
 
The combination of more conservative stock picks and lower turnover may imply either 
higher or lower returns depending upon which trait dominates. According to modern portfolio 
theory, taking greater investment risk should result in receiving a greater reward, so investing 
conservatively would necessarily lead to lower returns. This implies that men should have better 
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performance in their investments. However, given the empirical findings by numerous studies 
(see Lakonishok et al. (1994), La Porta et al. (1997), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003) among others) that value stocks outperform growth stocks in the long run,1 if 
females tend to invest in value-oriented stocks, then their long-term performances should be 
greater than males. Not to be forgotten, lower turnover implies lower transactions costs 
throughout the year, and therefore higher returns on the portfolio (see for example, Barber and 
Odean (2001, 2000)). So, if female managers express both the lack of confidence trait and a 
tendency toward conservative investing, women should make higher nominal returns than men. 
 
There are some reasons for mutual fund managers, regardless of gender, to behave 
differently than typical individual investors. First, fund managers’ investment choices are often 
constrained by limits set forth in the fund prospectus. With some exceptions, such as sector 
funds, prospectuses typically have diversification requirements that do not allow fund managers 
to invest large portions of the funds that they manage in individual stocks, sectors, or other high-
risk investments. A second reason for fund managers to behave differently than individual 
investors is that almost all fund managers have college degrees, whereas only 28% of adults in 
the United States had attained bachelor’s degrees.2 According to both Atkinson et al. (2003) and 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999), more than 50% of mutual fund managers hold MBAs and more 
than 35% hold CFAs. So, clearly, mutual fund managers are much more educated than the 
average person in the United States. Since mutual fund managers have an obvious advantage 
over the general investing public in education, and because of their legally imposed investment 
                                                 
1 However, Chan et al. (2002) find evidence that growth managers outperform value managers after adjusting for 
style. 
2 U.S. Department of Education (2005) 
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constraints, fund managers of different genders may act more similarly to each other than to the 
general investing public. 
 
In this paper, the performance and investment behavior of male and female domestic 
(US) stock mutual fund managers will be examined and compared for differences. This is in 
contrast to work by Atkinson, et al. (2003) which limits its study of mutual funds to fixed-
income funds. Due to this limitation, the authors are only able to study 72 female mutual fund 
managers spread across eleven fixed income categories, two of which had no female managers. 
This paper attempts to rectify this limitation to an extent by including all domestic stock funds 
traded in the US as the starting sample (9,327 funds). It extends Chevalier and Ellison (1999) by 
specifically studying the manager’s gender as well as including more recent data. 
 
We find some differences in our matched comparison which suggest that female mutual 
fund managers have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation) than male managers with the 
funds that they are managing. Possibly as a result of their lower risk tolerance, we also find that 
they spread their risk out over more stocks and hold a lower percentage of assets in their top 10 
holdings. Also, females, more than males, tend to manage no-load funds in the value category. 
We also find that the determinants of abnormal returns (e.g. expense ratio, net assets, etc.) cannot 
be attributed to the gender of the fund managers. 
 
When we look at current fund managers, we only find a small significant difference in 
the performance of mutual funds due to management gender when we pool all male and female 
managers together and compare their abnormal returns (alphas) as a group. However, in our 
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other tests for current managers, we find no differences in performance between fund managers 
based upon gender. 
 
When we examine performance within funds over time, we show that a change in the 
gender composition of a fund’s management is related to performance. The strongest evidence 
we find is that when a fund has a major change in the gender composition of its management, it 
has significantly better returns than before the management change. There is also some evidence, 
although not conclusive, that one would receive a larger increase in performance if investing in a 
mutual fund that is undergoing a major decrease in the percentage of its female management, 
although both increasing and decreasing the percentage of female managers will result in better 
returns with new management. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section covers previous literature 
relevant to the ideas presented in this paper. The third section gives a description of the data and 
data sources. We present our hypotheses and models in the fourth section. Section V. enumerates 
the empirical results, and the last section summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature regarding mutual funds and gender differences in investments is extensive. 
We have, therefore broken it into four distinct sections. The first reviews the differences between 
men and women in making financial decisions. The second section deals more directly with 
manager-specific characteristics that may influence mutual fund returns. In the third section, we 
examine specific features common to mutual funds that have been analyzed in past literature and 
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have been shown to be important in determining mutual fund performance. In the final section, 
we review papers that examine problems associated with the measurement of mutual fund  
performance. 
 
2.1. Gender Differences in Financial Decisions 
Using account data from a large brokerage firm, Barber and Odean (2001) analyze the 
common stock investments of men and women for a period of six years. They record that men 
trade 45 percent more than women. This activity reduces the net returns received by men by 2.65 
percentage points a year. The return achieved by women was only reduced by 1.72 percentage 
points because of trading. They attribute the performance and trading activity of men to 
overconfidence in their investment abilities. 
 
Powell and Ansic (1997) also approach the topic from a behavioral finance perspective. 
They use survey data and find that females were more likely to attribute good performance to 
good luck and were less confident than males when controlling for a similar level of prior 
experience and education. This suggests that women investors were less confident than males in 
their predictions. The authors find that these results are not justified by most behavioral 
explanations. Also using a psychology survey experiment, Estes and Hosseini (1988) find that 
women have considerably less confidence when it comes to investment decisions. While men 
would rate their own confidence at about an 8.0 on a 10-point scale, women only rate their 
confidence at about 6.6. Sundén and Surette (1998) find that gender and marital status 
significantly affect allocation decisions when studying defined contribution retirement plans. 
Clearly the indication is that women tend to allocate their investments more conservatively than 
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men. Single men choose mostly stocks in their portfolios more than single women or married 
men, while married women choose mostly bonds, a significantly more conservative choice.3 
Schubert et al. (1999) disagree with most current literature on the topic, especially those that find 
that women are more risk averse than men based upon survey data. These authors do not use 
survey data. Rather, they conduct an experiment that brings out the risk tendencies of each 
gender in financial situations. For their experiment, they use two classrooms of students with 
approximately 70 subjects in each (divided nearly evenly between men and women), one is used 
as a control group, while the other is the studied group. They find that men and women’s risk-
taking behavior depends significantly on the financial decision setting.4 Also they find no 
differences in risk-taking behavior in men and women facing investment and insurance-related 
decisions in a controlled setting. They suggest that previous studies that amplify gender 
stereotyping may be erroneous. While all of these studies assert that their results are valuable, 
Powell and Ansic and Schubert et al. used students as their primary subject for their surveys and 
experiments. Using students may make their results more difficult to extrapolate to the general 
public due to the captive nature of their subjects and because of bias due to the age and education 
of their subjects. Also, these studies use relatively small sample sizes. Again, making it difficult 
to extrapolate their results to the general population. However, Estes and Hosseini use four 
groups: shareholders, security analysts, institutional investors, and upper division and graduate 
students. The first three groups were randomly selected by a third party. This method helps lend 
validity to their findings. 
 
                                                 
3 Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997), Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1997) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) have 
also used surveys and other economic data and similarly discover that women invest more conservatively than men. 
4 The instructions and procedures for the experiment conducted in Schubert et al. (1999) may be found (in English) 
at http://www.wif.ethz.ch/gruppe_schubert/people/srenate/srenate/papers/aea99 
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Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) look at fixed-income mutual fund managers and 
compare male and female managers to see if there is a difference in performance, risk, or other 
characteristics. They find that there are no significant differences based on gender. This suggests 
to them that differences found in the literature may be attributed to investor knowledge and 
wealth constraints. Even though they do not find difference among the investment choices of 
managers, they do find that the manager’s gender influences the investors’ decision on whether 
to invest in a fund. Female fund managers receive lower fund inflows into funds that they are 
managing in the first year managing a particular fund. 
 
2.2. Manager Attributes Affecting Mutual Fund Performance 
As described in the previous section, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) are the only 
authors to fully analyze gender along with other characteristics in fund managers to determine 
whether the manager’s gender is a factor in mutual fund performance. Although they do not look 
at gender, there are other studies look at manager characteristics to determine whether other 
manager attributes may affect fund performance. 
 
In a study by Chevalier and Ellison (1999), the authors suggest that certain characteristics 
of fund managers may be related to that manager’s fund performance. The variables they analyze 
are: the manager’s age, the average composite SAT score at the manager’s undergraduate 
institution, and whether the manager has an MBA. They do not study gender differences or 
control for them. Although they find that only the undergraduate college attended by the 
manager turns out to be relevant (after controlling for biases), this finding may be due to the 
sample that they used. They used managers from 1988 to 1995. Some of their data was back-
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filled. Other data they used was manually entered based on assumptions about the manager’s age 
when graduating college or about the schools attended by these managers. These assumptions 
may introduce biases that lead the authors to incorrect conclusions. Also, Chevalier and Ellison 
study a time-frame when the stocks were in the midst of a significant bull market in the United 
States. Their results may not hold when considering stagnant or bear markets. Golec (1996) also 
analyzes whether non-gender manager characteristics explain fund performance, risk and fees. 
He runs simultaneous tests to avoid bias exhibited by other studies that do not take into account 
the simultaneity. Endogenous variables in his regressions include portfolio yield and alpha, 
portfolio beta and the standard deviation of residual portfolio returns, and expenses exclusive of 
management fees, management fees and portfolio turnover. His exogenous variables consist of 
manager age, tenure with the fund, years of education, whether or not the manager has an MBA 
degree, management team size, fund age, fund assets, load charge, and fund objective. To avoid 
other biases such as survivorship bias, they use a relatively short time period of three years. He 
finds that manager characteristics do affect performance, risk and fees. Along with some of the 
traditional fundamental variables that are important in determining performance, fees and risk, 
manager age, tenure and education are important determinants.5 
 
2.3. Other Factors Affecting Mutual Fund Performance 
Mutual fund performance can be shown to be influenced by several elements that are 
common to all mutual funds. Empirical testing of mutual funds has been around for almost forty 
years with Jensen (1968) testing the performance of funds up until that time. In the last two 
decades, studies such as Droms and Walker (2001), Ippolitio (1989), Shukla and Trzcinka 
                                                 
5 Gottesman and Morey (2006) emphasize the significance of manager education as an important determinant in 
fund performance. They find that mutual fund managers that received MBAs from a top school achieved 
significantly greater performance than other managers. 
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(1992), Walker (1997) and Zera and Madura (2001) have all found links between mutual fund 
performance and characteristics of these funds such as expense ratio, loads, total net assets, 
portfolio risk, diversification level, and portfolio composition. While academics often find strong 
relationships between performance and fund characteristics, researchers are not always in 
agreement on which of these is significant. A description of some significant literature regarding 
specific factors that influence mutual fund performance follows. 
 
The literature surrounding the importance of expense ratios on mutual fund performance 
shows a consensus that mutual fund expense ratios matter when determining their performance. 
This is probably the only factor that is universally agreed upon by researchers to affect 
performance. For example, Malhotra and McLeod (1997) and Walker (1997) show that funds 
with lower management fees and expenses increase returns. Elton et al. (1996a) not only 
establish that low expense funds outperform high expense funds, but that this observation holds 
even when comparing load funds with low expenses with no-load funds with high annual 
expenses.6 Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) show that mutual fund returns are 
affected most directly by expenses and transaction costs. They determine that expenses have a 
negative impact on performance that is at least proportionate to the level of the expense ratio.7 
This suggests that an investor who does not have the ability to do the extensive research to find 
the best fund managers can simply look for funds with low expenses to receive returns that are 
comparable.8 It also suggests that the higher expense ratios do not serve a meaningful purpose 
and should be avoided. However, two studies assert that higher mutual fund expense ratios do 
                                                 
6 Hooks (1996) comes to the same conclusion. 
7 Fabozzi et al. (1991) conclude that any improved ability demonstrated by managers in forecasting fund 
performance is negated by operating expenses and transaction costs. 
8 Dellva and Olson (1998) concur with this assessment by stating that funds with superior performance tend to have 
lower expense ratios. 
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have a purpose. Droms and Walker (1995) show that expense ratios are not predictive of fund 
performance by demonstrating that the funds that have higher returns typically take greater risks 
and have higher expense ratios. Grinblatt and Titman (1994) have an explanation for this result. 
They explain that funds that do more research and trade the most may be exposing stocks that are 
underpriced. Golec (1996) suggests that higher expense ratios may be a signal that management 
has superior investment skills. Obviously, these skills would imply greater fund performance. It 
would seem, though, that most empirical findings refute these arguments. 
 
As to whether load status of a fund is instrumental in affecting fund performance, it has 
been documented in research (for example Kihn (1996) and Israelsen (2003)) that loads 
generally negatively affect mutual fund performance. In fact studies performed by Malhotra and 
McLeod (1997) and Hooks (1996) show that front-end loads perform significantly worse than 
no-load funds. These studies illustrate that buying funds with front-end loads almost always will 
provide a lower expected return than buying no-load funds. No studies suggest that load is not an 
important factor in determining fund performance.9  
 
The literature for total net assets (size of the fund) is a bit unclear. Droms and Walker 
(1995) show that smaller funds outperform larger funds, on average. They also find that these 
smaller funds invest in riskier assets, so it is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the improved 
performance is due to the size or the risk. Several studies, including those by Malhotra and 
McLeod (1997) show that larger funds typically produce higher returns.10 There are also studies 
that show that fund size is not a determining factor at all in mutual fund performance. Grinblatt 
                                                 
9 However, Droms and Walker (1995) find that whether a fund has or does not have a load has no bearing on the 
riskiness of the fund. 
10 Markese (2000) also asserts that larger funds produce higher returns. 
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and Titman (1994) present evidence that mutual fund size and performance are unrelated. They 
explain that it is not possible to attain superior performance by investing in a fund based upon its 
total net assets. 
 
According to both theory and empirical evidence from noted researchers like Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992), more risk provides higher expected and higher 
achieved returns.11 Droms and Walker (1995) use standard deviation to proxy for risk. They 
show that risk is the most highly correlated determining factor in equity mutual fund 
performance.12  
 
Diversification, investing in different sectors and many stocks, can be used as another 
proxy for risk. The more diversified the fund, the less risky it is (see for example Jennings (1971) 
and Westerfield (1975)). This makes sense, because with more stocks in differing sectors, a fund 
should act more like the overall market. Similar to Prather (2004), to get the diversification 
effect, two proxies will be considered: the total number of holdings, and percent of assets in the 
top ten holdings. Lower diversification allows for the potential for higher returns, but at a greater 
risk. 
 
Domestic mutual funds may be broken down into several “styles.” One way to categorize 
style is based upon size and another is based upon value stocks versus growth stocks. Size can be 
proxied easily by using the total net asset value of the fund as discussed above. The lower the 
P/E ratio, the more likely the fund is value-oriented, while high P/E ratios likely will be 
                                                 
11 More recently, Markese (1999) comes to the same conclusion. 
12 Many other studies, including Barber (1994) and Cloonan (2002) use historical standard deviation to measure the 
risk of a mutual fund. 
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associated with growth-oriented funds. This is also a very commonly used factor to proxy to 
distinguish between growth and value securities in the literature (See Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000), Hunt and Hoisington (2003) and Penman (1996) among others).13 
 
The turnover ratio of a mutual fund is usually computed by taking a fund’s purchases or 
sales and dividing by the fund’s average total net assets. A lower number implies a buy-and-hold 
strategy by the fund and usually means lower trading costs which should translate into a higher 
return. These ratios can be used to determine behavioral factors that influence investment 
decision-making and performance in mutual funds. If men and women have systematic 
differences in these variables, the performance of their portfolios could be affected. For example, 
Barber and Odean (2001) found that men trade 45% more than women in their experiment with a 
limited amount of data. They suggest that women should outperform men, on a risk-adjusted 
basis, due to overconfidence exhibited by men as illustrated by their increased turnover ratios. 
Also, the high turnover ratios usually result in higher expenses and lower performance due to 
transactions costs. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Malhotra and McLeod (1997), among 
others, show that lower turnover is associated with greater fund performance.14 
  
The mutual fund manager’s length of service, or tenure is also often found to be 
correlated with its performance. Golec (1996) states that it is likely that funds that show superior 
performance will normally be managed by people with a lengthy tenure. This is because 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that Daniel et al. (1997) reported that historical measures such as P/E, price-to-book, and 
market capitalization are not able to determine fund performance alone. They use composite measures that 
encapsulate several fund characteristics, such as size, book-to-market, momentum, management investment timing, 
and a fund’s tendency to hold certain types of stocks. As such, they call their approach a “characteristics-based” 
approach. They find that these composite measures are necessary to determine fund performance accurately. 
14 This is in contrast to the results achieved by Droms and Walker (1995), who find turnover is unable to predict 
increased performance over any specified period. 
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managers that do not consistently perform well are eventually dismissed. Markese (2000) 
concludes that new managers need to prove themselves before investors should entrust him with 
their funds. New managers, therefore, should be shunned until they can prove their ability to 
provide superior performance.  
 
2.4. Mutual Fund Performance Measurement  
Early papers use simple linear regressions using a single-factor model such as CAPM 
when analyzing mutual fund performance. For example, Jensen (1968) used CAPM to show that 
mutual funds do not outperform the market on average. These methods were convenient for early 
empirical studies because the cost of computing was very large compared to today’s standards. 
With advances in theory, multifactor models are now most commonly used to measure 
performance. Blake et al. (1993), Chavalier and Ellison (1999) and Atkinson et al. (2003) all use 
index and factor models that show abnormal performance based upon controlling for systematic 
differences in return. The intercept term is usually construed to be abnormal performance relative 
to these given independent indexes and/or factors. 
 
2.5. Other Considerations in Mutual Fund Performance Measurement  
Malkiel (1995) studies a large set of funds from 1971 – 1991 with no survivorship bias. 
He found that strategies that would have produced large excess returns in the 1970s did not 
succeed in the 1980s. So, he concludes that there is no “dependable” strategy for creating 
consistent excess returns over time. He also notes that survivorship bias is a bigger problem than 
previously thought. Elton et al. (1996b) and Walker (1997) show that survivorship bias is a 
significant problem with estimating performance. They claim that almost all previous studies use 
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performance measures that overstate true performance (alpha is biased upward). This bias is 
caused by the disappearance of poor performing that closed, failed, or merged into another fund. 
Brown, et al. (1992) identify persistence in above average returns among all funds. This was later 
determined by Carpenter and Lynch (1999) to be highly correlated with survivorship bias. 
Jayaraman et al. (2002) suggest that to avoid survivorship bias, one must account for funds that 
have disappeared from the database over time. To accomplish this, they use all data available for 
all funds from some past starting date and predict the fund’s future per performance based upon 
this data. They must track each fund through closures, mergers and name changes in order to 
have a survivorship bias-free sample. 
 
Elton et al. (1996a) look at persistence in risk-adjusted mutual fund performance 
controlling for survivorship bias. They find that past performance is able to predict future mutual 
fund performance on a risk-adjusted basis. They also can show that in a down market, they can 
construct a portfolio of actively managed funds that outperform index funds, implying that 
managers add value to the portfolios they manage. In a study that also looks at persistence in 
mutual fund performance, Carhart (1997) uses a sample free of survivorship bias to show that 
common factors almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds’ risk-adjusted 
returns. The only unexplained persistence is by the worst mutual funds which show a strong 
underperformance. His work suggests that managers do not add significantly to the return of the 
portfolios that they manage. Prather et al. (2004) study a large set of mutual funds and examine 
recent performance controlling for survivorship bias and benchmark error. Benchmark error has 
been identified as the sensitivity of fund performance to the benchmark used to proxy the market 
return. Using a large market capitalization benchmark such as the S&P 500 tends to bias the 
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results of small capitalization funds in a positive way. The authors find that when these factors 
are controlled for, most previous literature is still robust in the factors that determine fund 
performance. However, their study shows that there is no persistence in fund performance. 
 
3. Data 
 
All data for this study were obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual 
Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. From this CD, the following variables were obtained: 
monthly returns, net assets, expense ratio, standard deviation, total number of holdings, 
percentage of assets in top 10 holdings, P/E ratio, turnover, the starting date for the current 
management, and whether the fund was a no-load fund or not.  
 
Manager information was also included on this disk. This information includes the names 
of all current and prior fund managers and a short biography of current managers that includes 
the manager’s starting date with the fund, undergraduate and graduate degrees received along 
with the year the degrees were received, and the names of the degree-granting institutions. 
 
The data began with all 9,327 domestic (US) stock mutual funds. These funds were 
extensively filtered, reducing the sample size to 2,217. The reason for the filters was to remove 
all funds that have managerial traits that did not fit with comparing the male-female dynamic. 
Funds that were closed to new investment were eliminated because of their differing 
performance characteristics with other mutual funds. Exchange-traded funds (ETFs), 
unmanaged, and team-managed funds were eliminated because there was no discernable 
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manager from which to obtain information. A minimum three-year performance measure was 
used to include only funds with a minimal performance track record and to assure enough data 
for a monthly study. This three-year time frame is the same measure that Morningstar uses to 
provide their first “Morningstar Rating.” If several classes of a fund existed (e.g. A, B, C, and I 
classes), the duplicate portfolios were removed to get a more realistic number of actual differing 
portfolios that were managed by women. Per Carhart (1997) the class with the longest history 
was the one selected for analysis, while any other classes were filtered out. If two or more 
classes have identical inception dates, the one with larger net assets is selected. Finally, “Bear 
Market” and “Convertible Bond” funds are removed even though they are described by 
Morningstar as domestic equity funds because of their starkly differing objectives and 
characteristics from other domestic equity funds. As mentioned earlier, the filtered sample has 
2,217 total funds of which 233 were primarily managed by women (10.51%). Where there was 
missing data, the most recent fund report (prospectus, annual, and/or semi-annual reports) was 
used to correct this deficiency.  
 
Gottesman and Morey (2006), Atkinson, et al. (2003) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
use management education characteristics from the fund profile provided by Morningstar. When 
reviewing these data, it was found that the education data was actually quite lacking on the data 
CD provided by Morningstar. Out of the 2,217 fund managers that were in the filtered data set, 
only 909 of them had any education background listed at all (41.0%). The two papers above then 
proceeded to separate out the managers who held MBAs from those that did not and extrapolate 
an age for the manager based on an arbitrary assumption that the manager graduated from his or 
her undergraduate college at the age of 21. We found that much of the education-related material 
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was dependent upon the fund family to which the mutual fund belonged. Some fund families 
reported education backgrounds while others did not. This distinction illustrates a rather large 
flaw in the data. Essentially, all of the papers that directly assess manager education 
characteristics are analyzing only funds that belong to fund families that report their managers’ 
education characteristics. Since only 41% of managers had education data listed, it is clear that 
there may be problems in interpreting their results that use education variables and extrapolating 
those results onto the universe of fund managers. Since it appears that many of the larger fund 
families do report managers’ education data (such as Fidelity and Vanguard) and many smaller 
families do not, we would expect the education statistics to be biased toward higher education 
than the industry average. This is because presumably the larger groups have the ability to select 
top candidates at premium salaries, while many smaller groups are managed by the founder or a 
few in-house managers. It also might be embarrassing to smaller groups to report lower quality 
education data than their larger competitors. 
 
From the filtered sample of 2,217 total funds, two sub-samples are used in this study. In 
one sub-sample, the 233 female managers are matched based upon size and tenure, standard 
deviation (risk) and tenure, and the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure with their 
closest male counterparts. The first match (size and tenure) attempts to alleviate bias based on 
diseconomies of scale and manager experience. This matching is similar to Atkinson, et al. 
(2003). The second match (standard deviation and tenure) attempts to alleviate a potential self-
selection bias as well as control for manager experience. The self-selection bias occurs because 
the population of mutual fund managers may not represent the typical person as far as their risk-
aversion. If there is a disparity between the population of female and male managers relative to 
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the overall population, then a bias is introduced. So, we attempt to control for risk aversion using 
the standard deviation match. The final match (the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and 
tenure) was used because we noticed in our matched sample of 233 male and female managers, 
the male managers in the matched sample had significantly different means for their percent of 
assets in the top 10 holdings from the full sample. So, this match was to control for a potential 
bias in asset concentration between the matched sample and the full sample of male domestic 
equity fund managers. Thus, the final sample used for this part of the analysis consists of the 233 
female managers and their 233 male counterparts, or 466 total managers and funds. 
 
In the other sub-sample, from the original filtered sample of 2,217 funds, all funds were 
selected that had at one time (since March 1984) a major change in management gender 
composition, either from female to male or male to female. A major change is defined as at least 
50% of the managers of a fund at a specific time must be female (male) and change to at least 
50% male (female). Examples might include funds that change from 100% male to 50% female 
or 100% female to 67% male. Also, the same manager composition must remain in control of the 
fund for at least 12 months both before and after the date of change in gender composition. This 
resulted in a sample of 102 funds with a total of 150 gender composition changes. Of the 150 
changes in the sample, 90 were male to female changes, with the remainder being female to male 
changes. 
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Factors for the regression analyses were obtained from Kenneth French’s website. These 
include Rm-Rf, HML, SMB and UMD.15 Rm-Rf represents the market returns; HML represents 
a value factor; SMB represents a size factor; and UMD represents a momentum factor. 
 
4. Hypotheses and Models 
 
It appears that the majority of academic research agrees that, in general, men and women 
have systematic behavioral differences in the way that they invest. Women tend to be more risk 
averse than men. However, do these differences in investing behavior carry over to the 
presumably more experienced mutual fund managers? In the only study that attempted to find 
differences between mutual fund managers based upon their gender, Atkinson, et al. (2003) were 
unable to find a significant difference in performance between male and female mutual fund 
managers when studying 72 male and 72 female domestic fixed-income managers. Schubert et 
al. (1999) conduct an experiment that provides supporting evidence for this conclusion. They 
argue that the differences in investment choices between men and women found by others are the 
product of survey data which lack adequate controls for individual risk-taking behavior. Both of 
these studies suffer from small sample sizes and other problems noted in the literature review. 
However, taken together, if their results hold, then given their superior training and knowledge 
of investments relative to the general public, it is likely that performance differences between 
male and female fund managers are insignificant. If the majority of behavioral investment 
literature is correct, and males and females invest in systematically different ways, then we might 
see this also appear in mutual fund managers. Female managers should have lower turnover, 
                                                 
15 Construction of these variables can be found on Kenneth French’s data library web site at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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invest more in conservative stocks than their male counterparts. This should ultimately lead to 
higher returns due to the lower transactions costs and the long-term advantage of the more 
conservative value stocks over growth stocks. This leads us to the hypotheses that we will 
discuss in this paper. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (NULL): Within styles of mutual funds, fund characteristics do not vary 
dependent upon the fund manager’s gender. 
 
The alternative to Hypothesis 1 is that within styles of mutual funds, fund characteristics 
vary significantly depending upon whether the fund manager is male or female. If we find that 
differences exist, it will confirm that the evidence in the literature regarding differences in 
investment choices of males and females also applies to mutual fund managers. Our expectation 
is that there are no differences between genders, but if we find differences, we would expect that 
female managers are more conservative in their investments. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we will do a comparison of means between female and male 
mutual fund managers who manage funds within each of the following fund styles: value, blend, 
growth, and other funds.16 Paired t-tests are performed for the following fund characteristics 
which are widely regarded in the literature as being important to determining mutual fund 
returns: expense ratio, standard deviation (proxy for risk), number of holdings (proxy for 
diversification), percentage of assets in top 10 holdings (proxy for concentration and 
diversification), P/E ratio (proxy for value), turnover as defined by purchases or sales (whichever 
                                                 
16 Other funds includes funds that consist primarily of domestic stocks that are not able to be categorized in one of 
the aforementioned categories. These include sector funds and funds that have a relatively high percentage of bonds 
in the fund’s investment mix (>20%). 
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is less) divided by the average monthly net assets, whether the fund was a no-load fund or not, 
net assets (fund size) and the length of the manager’s tenure (to control for experience). For this 
analysis, we use matched sub-samples of the data. Each female-managed fund in the full sample 
is matched with a male-managed fund in three different ways. The first match is based upon size 
and tenure; the second is based upon standard deviation (risk) and tenure; and the third is based 
upon the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure. In the first match, net assets (size) 
and fund manager tenure should not different at any level of significance since the sample 
already controls for these variables. The same logic holds true for standard deviation and tenure 
and the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure in the second and third sample 
pairings. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Returns do not vary in a systematic way due to the gender of the fund 
manager. 
 
When considering the performance of mutual fund managers, we expect that the 
similarities in the education and experience of fund managers will outweigh the differences in 
gender. If we find differences in fund performance, it will inform investors how to increase 
returns based upon the gender characteristics of mutual fund management. Further, it will inform 
the mutual funds, themselves, how to adjust their management gender compositions to increase 
performance. If there are both characteristic differences (as in our first hypothesis) and 
performance differences, mutual fund managers may be able to learn how to alter behavior to 
remove the differences in gender characteristics and performance. 
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In examining the performance of the male- and female-managed mutual funds, two basic 
models are used, a one-index model and a multi-factor model. These are similar to the models 
advocated by Blake, Elton, and Gruber (1993) in their study of fixed income funds. The primary 
difference is that Blake, Elton, and Gruber studied fixed-income mutual funds, whereas the 
models here focus on the domestic equity market. Also, we incorporate the momentum factor in 
our four-factor model. The one-index model used is: 
tptpptp Ir ,, εβα ++=      (1) 
where tpr ,  is the excess return on the pth fund during month t, pα  is the abnormal excess return 
on the portfolio, pβ  is the standard market-model risk measure, and tI  is the excess return on a 
domestic stock index portfolio. We use the Russell 1000 index and the S&P 500 index for the 
market index. The Russell 1000 was chosen because it was the best-fit index for all domestic 
equity funds based upon the adjusted-R-squared in single-index regressions run against the 
monthly returns of each mutual fund independently.17 The S&P 500 was also chosen because 
data is available from March 1984, the beginning of our sample period. Returns were not 
available for the Russell 1000 until January 1993. We also use the S&P 500 for robustness 
comparisons and because it is much more widely used in the literature as a proxy for the market 
index. 
 
The multi-factor model used in this paper is: 
                                                 
17 Morningstar reported the Russell 1000 was the best-fit index for more funds than for any other index, with the 
S&P 500 the best fit index for the second largest number of funds. We independently ran regressions and verified 
this data. 
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where tpr ,  is the excess return on the pth fund during month t, pα  is the abnormal excess return 
on the portfolio, ip ,β  are the sensitivities of the excess returns on the factors, tiI ,  are the 
systematic factors that account for the return, and J  is the number of systematic factors 
employed in the model (three and four for this paper). 
 
The three-factor model uses the Fama-French factors, Rm–Rf, SMB, and HML. We use 
these factors because of the significant body of literature in the last fifteen years linking the 
factors to explaining returns (Fama and French, 1992). Rm–Rf is a value-weighted excess return 
on the market. SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on three small portfolios minus the 
average return on three big portfolios. It encapsulates the idea that small company stocks 
outperform large company stocks over time. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on 
two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios. HML encompasses the 
assertion that value stocks (high book-to-market) outperform growth stocks (low book-to-
market) over time. For the four-factor model, the Fama-French factors are used along with a 
momentum factor. Momentum was originally suggested as important for determining returns by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Carhart (1997) employs a momentum factor and finds that it 
significantly improves the ability of his model to predict fund returns. The momentum factor 
used is called UMD (Up Minus Down). It is the average return on the two high prior return 
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portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios from six value-
weighted portfolios formed on size and prior returns.18 
 
Analysis is performed using the one-index and multi-factor models in several ways. In 
the first half of the analyses, we look at only current managers. First, we regress all 2,217 funds 
individually using OLS to obtain an abnormal return (alpha). Then we compare the means using 
a t-test. If the t-test is significant, we will be able to tell which gender typically produces higher 
returns. In our second analysis, we include a dummy with each fund to show whether the fund is 
currently managed by a male or a female. The models are appended as follows: 
tppptpptp GenderIr ,, εγβα +++=    (1A) 
 tppp
J
i
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1
,,, εγβα +++= ∑
=
   (2A) 
where Gender is equal to one if the current manager is female and zero if male. All 2,217 funds 
were analyzed using a pooled-regression technique to see if the dummy, and therefore gender, is 
significant. If the dummy is positive and significant, then female managers produce better returns 
than male managers. Our third test with current managers is a pooled regression comparison of 
all female managers and all male managers. The alpha for female managers is compared to the 
alpha from male managers using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique. We 
subtract the return of the male managers from the return of the female managers. If the result is 
positive and significant, then current female fund managers outperform current male managers. 
 
                                                 
18 The UMD factor and the Fama-French factors are available to the public from Kenneth French’s web site at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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The second half of our next analysis is performed by using the second sub-sample of the 
data. Using 102 funds that include 150 major changes in management gender, the single-index 
and multi-factor models are expanded by introducing a dummy into the models to indicate when 
a fund had a major change in the gender composition as defined in the data section. Here we are 
directly comparing two time periods within the management of a single mutual fund. We use this 
sub-sample because a difference in abnormal returns between genders should be easier to 
determine when there is a major change in the gender composition of management than when 
only a minor change occurs. For example, it should be easier to differentiate the performance 
differences in gender when management changes from 33% female to 100% female than when it 
changes from 25% female to 33% female. Here we introduce a dummy, Change, into the one-
index and multi-factor models to indicate the months tested with a larger proportion of female 
managers. The adjusted equations are as follows: 
tptpptpptp ChangeIr ,,, εγβα +++=    (1B) 
 tptpp
J
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  (2B) 
where Change is equal to one when there is a higher percentage of female managers between the 
two periods, and zero denotes a relatively higher percentage of male managers between the two 
periods. The dummy remains equal to zero (or one) for the period of the earlier management 
tenure just before there is a change in management. When new management takes over the fund, 
we skip a six-month window to allow new management to be fully in control of the fund’s assets 
(and therefore, return). Then we allow the dummy to change to one (or zero) and remain there 
during the period of the later management tenure. We use both 12- and 24-month periods for 
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robustness and to be sure that we are using enough data. See the diagram for a timeline of the 
data used for this analysis. 
 
 
 
First, a panel regression (see Greene, 2003) is run to determine if the change in gender is 
significant. The models are implemented on as many of the 150 management gender changes as 
possible, given the restrictions above. We also separate the sample into male-to-female changes 
and the female-to-male changes in management gender. Since in all cases, the change dummy is 
equal to one for an increase in female management, a positive and significant result for this 
dummy will indicate that female management outperforms male management over time within a 
fund. 
 
In our second analysis of changes in manager gender, we run a panel regression 
comparison of all female managers and all male managers and do a test that is similar to one that 
we performed with current managers. The alpha for female managers is compared to the alpha 
from male managers using a SUR technique. This analysis is performed for all gender changes as 
well as male-to-female and the female-to-male changes in management gender. We subtract the 
return of the male managers from the return of the female managers. If the result is positive and 
significant, then female managers outperform male managers over time within a fund. 
Old Management Period New Management Period 
12- or 24-month 
tested period 
12- or 24-month 
tested period 
6-month window 
(not tested) 
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Our third analysis of changes in manager gender uses the actual percentage of female 
managers for each month of the fund’s existence, or as far back as March 1984, whichever is 
less. Again, we use the second sub-sample of data of 102 funds that include 150 major changes 
in management gender. We also use the panel regression technique for this analysis to determine 
whether gender is related to the performance of the funds. The new equations look similar to the 
equations for the previous analysis, except that the introduced term has changed: 
tptpptpptp FemaleIr ,,, εγβα +++=    (1C) 
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where Female is equal to the percentage of female managers managing the fund in any given 
month t. Here, if the coefficient for Female is positive and significant, then the percentage of 
female management is positively related to the performance of the fund over time. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Gender differences in factors that influence abnormal excess returns are 
insignificant 
 
In our last major analysis, we look at differences in factors that influence abnormal 
excess returns to see if there are any significant differences between genders. If we find that 
there are differences in factors that affect abnormal returns, the results of this analysis can be 
used in conjunction with the first two hypotheses presented earlier in this paper to inform 
investors what to look for in a fund to increase returns. It can also show mutual fund managers 
how factors differ between genders and how that influences returns to the funds. If differences 
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are found, it may also have implications on future management behavior. The gender that has the 
characteristic that reduces returns should be able to alter their behavior to increase returns by 
altering a specific characteristic of their investment behavior. For example, if we find that 
females have lower turnover, and turnover affects abnormal excess returns negatively, then male 
managers may wish to reduce the turnover in funds that they manage to increase performance. 
 
When attempting to see if the gender of the manager was an important determinant in the 
factors that influence abnormal performance of funds, a multi-factor regression was run on 
domestic equity mutual funds that were distinctly managed by men and women (rather than a 
management team or computer). The model used is:  
p
n
i
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,,
1
,,
ˆ    (3) 
where pαˆ  represents the abnormal excess return on the fund, pC  is a linear constant, V are the 
individual factors of the fund (from 1 to n), λ  is a slope coefficient for each V, pD  is a dummy 
that is equal to one if the fund is managed by a female and zero if the fund is managed by a male, 
pφ  is an adjustment for the constant term given that the fund is managed by a female, and θ  is 
the slope adjustment for each V, given that the fund is managed by a female. The factors used 
were the expense ratio, loads, net assets, portfolio risk (standard deviation of monthly returns), 
diversification variables (number of holdings, and percent of assets in top 10 holdings) and fund 
manager investment style (P/E and turnover). Abnormal excess return, pαˆ , is calculated using 
each of the single-index models and multi-factor models described under Hypothesis 2, 
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equations (1) and (2). Also, abnormal excess return and standard deviation are calculated for the 
tenure of the manager. The other factors are taken as of February 29, 2004. 
 
Essentially, this hypothesis is testing whether each pθ  is equal to zero. If any θ  is 
significantly different from zero, the factor associated with that θ  will affect abnormal excess 
returns differently for male and female fund managers. For example, if θ  is positive and 
significant for turnover, then female managers have higher abnormal excess returns than male 
managers due to their turnover (which is likely lower). Also, note that this analysis is done on a 
cross-sectional basis for a single time period (February 2004). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
A description of female domestic equity mutual fund managers relative to total funds in 
each category is illustrated in Table 2.1. All funds are separated into four categories: value, 
blend, growth and other. In Panel A, two things are apparent. First, female managers comprise 
only about 10.5% of all domestic equity mutual fund managers. This is significant in that it is a 
major constraint to the sample size when matching the female managers to male counterparts. It 
was based primarily upon the dearth of women fund managers that we were able to rather easily 
match funds in each of the three ways described earlier. Ultimately, there were ample male 
managers from which to choose a fund to match each female manager. The second thing that one 
might notice here is that females are slightly over-represented in the blend category and under-
represented in the value category. Almost 12% of blend managers are female, while only a little 
over 9% of value managers are female.
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Table 2.1. Female Domestic Equity Mutual Fund Managers 
 
Panel A. Female Managers as a Percentage of Funds by Category 
Category # of Female Managers Total Funds Percentage  
Value 35 373 9.38%  
Blend 68 576 11.81%  
Growth 75 732 10.25%  
Other 55 536 10.26%  
Total 233 2,217 10.51%  
     
Panel B. Female Managers by Category as a Percentage of All Female Managers  
    and Total Funds by Category as a Percentage of All Funds 
Category # of Female Managers Percentage Total Funds Percentage 
Value 35 15.02% 373 16.82% 
Blend 68 29.18% 576 25.98% 
Growth 75 32.19% 732 33.02% 
Other 55 23.61% 536 24.18% 
Total 233 100.00% 2,217 100.00% 
 
Note: This table illustrates the relative proportion of domestic equity fund managers that are 
female. Only funds actively managed primarily by a single male or female manager were 
considered when compiling this table. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia 
Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
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Panel B of Table 2.1 gives us a different view of the same information in Panel A. In 
Panel B, we can see that the total number of female managers is lowest for value funds, but also 
that it is lower than the percentage of total value funds to all funds. Also, we see that 29% of 
female mangers manage a blend fund. This is somewhat higher than the proportion of blend 
funds to total funds (26%). For the growth and “other” categories, the proportion of female 
managers is almost identical to the overall proportion of female managers to total funds. These 
two panels taken together suggest that there is a tendency for females to manage blend funds and 
not to manage value funds. 
 
Categorized comparisons of male and female fund managers for each of 10 fund 
characteristics are listed in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. Each category compares all distinct female 
fund managers in that category with a portfolio of matched male-managed mutual funds of the 
same category. The funds were separated into the value, blend, growth, and other style 
categories. The categories were not separated by size (i.e. large cap, mid cap and small cap) 
because separating the funds by size will reduce the sample size in some categories to as low as 
four. Comparisons in categories with such a small sample size are not statistically meaningful. 
We attempted to control for this shortcoming by matching the funds by total net assets in one of 
the tables. All funds were matched within their categories (value, blend, growth and other) to a 
male managed fund based upon net assets and tenure (Table 2.2), standard deviation and tenure 
(Table 2.3) and percentage of assets in top 10 holdings and tenure (Table 2.4). The first match 
(size and tenure) attempts to alleviate bias based on diseconomies of scale and manager 
experience. The second match (standard deviation and tenure) attempts to alleviate a potential 
self-selection bias as well as control for manager experience. The third match (the percent of 
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assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure) is to control for a potential bias in asset concentration 
between the matched sample and the full sample of male domestic equity fund managers.1 
 
In Table 2.2, we match by net assets (size) and tenure. Matched in this manner, there appear to 
be several statistically significant differences in the way that male managers and female 
managers manage their funds. In the value category, there were significant differences in two of 
the 10 variables tested: the turnover ratio and whether or not the fund was a no-load fund. These 
results suggest that in the value category female managers have a higher turnover ratio, and a 
higher propensity to manage a no-load fund. The higher turnover is very surprising given the 
theoretical background that females tend to trade less in the general population. In the blend 
category, the only significant difference found was in the P/E ratio of the funds. Female fund 
managers tend to have a slightly higher P/E ratio than males. In the growth category, females 
have a lower propensity to manage a no-load fund. And, in the “other funds” category, which 
includes all domestic stock funds in the original data set that were not characterized as value, 
blend or growth, the only significant difference between female and male managers was in the 
concentration of the fund. Female managers invest significantly less assets in their top ten 
holdings. 
 
An analysis was also performed on all 466 funds (all 233 female- and 233 matched male-
managed funds). There were significant differences in three categories when all funds were 
considered together. Male fund managers have a higher standard deviation in returns than their 
female counterparts. Also, male managers tend to concentrate their assets more in their top ten
                                                 
1 Note: Univariate results, such as these, do not control for various factors that might affect returns. A clearer picture 
will emerge with the multivariate analysis. 
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Table 2.2. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (Net Assets and Tenure) 
 
Category 
(Observations)  
Expense 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Number 
of Holdings 
% Assets in Top 
10 Holdings P/E Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio No-load 
Net 
Assets 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Value (35 pairs)           
 Male  1.268 17.549 107.9 26.269 16.091 53.914 0.457 1959.89 1461 
 Female  1.142 17.938 125.3 29.344 16.166 71.829 0.800 2028.78 1477 
 p-value  0.205 0.575 0.486 0.124 0.861 0.050** 0.003*** 0.430 0.873 
Blend (68 pairs)           
 Male  1.212 18.452 277.5 26.457 18.193 87.851 0.588 529.72 1497 
 Female  1.159 18.240 254.0 24.515 18.803 78.235 0.691 532.08 1496 
 p-value  0.544 0.702 0.804 0.407 0.096* 0.440 0.211 0.821 0.997 
Growth (75 pairs)           
 Male  1.399 22.027 99.0 25.665 23.597 128.797 0.640 501.17 1341 
 Female  1.380 20.877 111.9 23.844 24.613 112.160 0.480 490.37 1378 
 p-value  0.775 0.108 0.391 0.193 0.165 0.263 0.045** 0.437 0.567 
Other Funds (55 pairs)          
 Male  1.496 19.012 197.5 40.577 22.113 193.891 0.418 437.11 1312 
 Female  1.400 16.339 272.8 29.828 20.351 114.145 0.545 382.37 1240 
 p-value  0.398 0.220 0.146 0.006*** 0.311 0.135 0.164 0.470 0.159 
All Funds (233 pairs)           
 Male  1.348 19.599 176.4 29.507 20.519 121.074 0.545 713.500 1398 
 Female  1.286 18.595 193.1 26.279 20.653 96.670 0.605 708.140 1395 
 p-value  0.160 0.089* 0.479 0.011** 0.794 0.086* 0.151 0.813 0.931 
Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired 
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each 
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in 
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were 
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male 
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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holdings suggesting they may be less diversified than female managers, and they have a 
significantly higher turnover ratio than female managers. This result, based upon all 233 matched 
fund pairs, is what is expected of the general population. As noted earlier, female managers in 
the value category have a higher turnover than males, but when all of the categories are 
combined, another story emerges. The value category is where female managers are the least 
represented among all domestic funds. In all of the other categories, males have a higher 
turnover ratio, although the difference is not significant. Ultimately, these differences overwhelm 
the significant difference in the value category and when all funds are compared, male managers 
have the greater propensity to trade with a significantly higher turnover ratio. 
 
In Table 2.3, we match by standard deviation (risk) and tenure. Matched in this manner, 
some of the differences remain, but some are not robust to the different matching scheme. In the 
value category, significant differences are found in the total number of holdings and whether or 
not the fund was a no-load fund. Total number of holdings was not significant in the previous 
match, however the fund’s no-load status remained significant. Also, in the first match, turnover 
was significant, but that difference disappeared when matching based upon standard deviation. 
Females in the value category under the current match hold more stocks and are more likely to 
manage a no-load fund than male managers. In the blend category, the P/E ratio was significant 
in the first match, but failed to retain its significance when match by standard deviation. 
However, the percentage of assets in the manager’s top 10 holdings and the turnover ration were 
significant for blend managers in this match. Here, female managers hold less assets in their top 
10 holdings and have a higher turnover ratio than males. In the growth category, the no-load 
status is no longer significant, but the percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings and the P/E 
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Table 2.3. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (Standard Deviation and Tenure) 
 
Category 
(Observations)  
Expense 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Number 
of Holdings 
% Assets in Top 
10 Holdings P/E Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio No-load 
Net 
Assets 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Value (35 pairs)           
 Male  1.261 18.177 86.3 30.474 16.803 59.743 0.629 1490.847 1393 
 Female  1.142 17.938 125.3 29.344 16.166 71.829 0.800 2028.775 1477 
 p-value  0.205 0.237 0.057* 0.740 0.479 0.219 0.057* 0.748 0.291 
Blend (68 pairs)           
 Male  1.155 18.199 166.2 34.240 18.494 57.358 0.647 676.981 1451 
 Female  1.159 18.240 254.0 24.515 18.803 78.235 0.691 532.081 1497 
 p-value  0.867 0.460 0.122 0.005*** 0.447 0.044** 0.568 0.463 0.326 
Growth (75 pairs)           
 Male  1.458 20.818 95.4 29.011 23.266 125.360 0.613 328.468 1337 
 Female  1.380 20.877 111.9 23.844 24.613 112.160 0.480 490.370 1379 
 p-value  0.356 0.333 0.408 0.004*** 0.045** 0.317 0.105 0.291 0.383 
Other Funds (55 pairs)          
 Male  1.377 16.299 159.9 39.346 19.364 143.800 0.473 1039.182 1223 
 Female  1.400 16.339 272.8 29.828 20.351 114.145 0.545 382.367 1240 
 p-value  0.819 0.564 0.077* 0.019** 0.407 0.456 0.455 0.248 0.680 
All Funds (233 pairs)           
 Male  1.320 18.590 130.4 33.197 19.942 100.194 0.592 772.551 1362 
 Female  1.286 18.595 193.1 26.279 20.653 96.670 0.605 708.140 1395 
 p-value  0.376 0.913 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.082* 0.747 0.768 0.825 0.220 
Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired 
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each 
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in 
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were 
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male 
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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ratio are significant. Female managers in the growth category hold less assets in the top 10 
holdings and have a higher P/E ratio. In the “other” category, the percentage of assets in the top 
10 holdings retained its significance from the first match. Also significant in this match is the 
total number of holdings, with females holding more stocks and less assets in their top 10 
holdings. 
 
When all categories are merged there are three characteristic that are significantly 
different between male and female managers. Females hold significantly more stocks and have a 
significantly lower concentration in their top 10 holdings. Also, the P/E ratio for females is 
higher than male managers. As with the net assets and tenure match, the results for all 233 
matched pairs when matched on standard deviation and tenure are in line with what one would 
expect of the general population of male and female investors. 
 
In Table 2.4, we match female funds again to male funds, this time based upon the 
percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure. In the value category, the total number of 
holdings is significant along with whether or not the fund was a no-load fund. Females hold 
significantly more stocks than males in this category. Also, females are more likely to manage a 
no-load fund, a finding that we showed was significant in both of the other matches. In the blend 
category, there were no significant differences between male and female managers based upon 
this match. In the growth category, the only significantly different characteristic was whether the 
fund was a no-load fund or not. However, in this category, males were more likely than females 
to manage a no-load fund. In the “other” category, the only significant difference is in the 
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Table 2.4. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (% Assets in Top 10 Holdings and Tenure) 
 
Category 
(Observations)  
Expense 
Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Number 
of Holdings 
% Assets in Top 
10 Holdings P/E Ratio 
Turnover 
Ratio No-load 
Net 
Assets 
Tenure 
(Days) 
Value (35 pairs)           
 Male  1.293 18.208 94.743 29.318 15.863 103.735 0.514 379.711 1355 
 Female  1.142 17.938 125.257 29.344 16.166 71.829 0.800 2028.775 1477 
 p-value  0.170 0.733 0.056* 0.961 0.516 0.268 0.010*** 0.307 0.175 
Blend (68 pairs)           
 Male  1.135 18.530 278.926 24.770 18.902 62.897 0.647 775.361 1456 
 Female  1.159 18.240 254.000 24.515 18.803 78.235 0.691 532.081 1497 
 p-value  0.770 0.478 0.486 0.192 0.877 0.106 0.594 0.460 0.284 
Growth (75 pairs)           
 Male  1.327 21.634 122.836 23.860 23.897 190.493 0.627 609.366 1335 
 Female  1.380 20.877 111.907 23.844 24.613 112.160 0.480 490.370 1379 
 p-value  0.517 0.201 0.506 0.777 0.258 0.148 0.078* 0.485 0.176 
Other Funds (55 pairs)          
 Male  1.465 19.711 289.164 30.119 21.318 162.964 0.600 1440.923 1286 
 Female  1.400 16.339 272.818 29.828 20.351 114.145 0.545 382.367 1240 
 p-value  0.567 0.063* 0.795 0.273 0.483 0.309 0.606 0.152 0.284 
All Funds (233 pairs)           
 Male  1.299 19.760 204.130 26.423 20.610 133.853 0.609 819.604 1356 
 Female  1.286 18.595 193.103 26.319 20.653 96.670 0.605 708.140 1395 
 p-value  0.736 0.019** 0.587 0.228 0.962 0.083* 0.927 0.724 0.174 
Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired 
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each 
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in 
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were 
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male 
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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standard deviation, with female managers having somewhat lower standard deviation in the 
returns of the funds that they manage. 
 
When reviewing and analyzing Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 together, it is difficult to draw an 
unambiguous conclusion based upon the paired t-test results. Many of the results that look 
promising in the separate categories do not hold when funds are matched using different 
methods. However, there are some common results that may be seen in all three tables. First, Net 
assets and expense ratio are never significantly different between the genders. This holds across 
all categories and all tables. The most clearly significant result is that females are more likely to 
manage a no-load fund in the value category than are males. This result is robust to all three 
types of matches. Also, we note that when looking at the all 233 matched pairs, standard 
deviation is significant in both tables that are not matched by standard deviation. Females 
typically achieve less standard deviation in returns than their male counterparts. Along the same 
lines, the percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings is significant in both tables that are not 
matched by percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings. Females have a significantly lower 
percentage of assets in their top 10 holdings suggesting that they spread the assets in their funds 
out over a larger number of holdings. One other result that we see is that the total number of 
holdings is significant in two of the three matches, suggesting that it may be significant 
depending upon the fund manager’s gender. In this case, females have significantly more 
holdings than males. Each of these findings lead to the conclusion that we would expect from a 
sample of the general public (see Barber and Odean (2001) among others). The argument is that 
essentially, females have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation). Therefore, they spread their 
risk out over many stocks and hold few assets in their top 10 holdings. 
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Because many of the significant results from Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 seem to suggest the 
same idea, we were interested to see if these factors are highly correlated. As shown below they 
are not very highly correlated, but the correlations are significant in two of the three cases. The 
largest absolute correlation is about 32%. The correlation presented is correlation of the three 
matched sets of male- and female-managed funds combined. Funds with 10 or less holdings and 
funds with missing data were removed. Funds that were in multiple matches were only counted 
once, leaving a final sample of 821 funds. 
 
Characteristic 1 Characteristic 2 Correlation
% Assets in Top 10 Holdings Standard Deviation 0.016     .
% Assets in Top 10 Holdings Total Number of Holdings –0.315***
Total Number of Holdings Standard Deviation –0.168***
*** Correlation is significant at the 1% level 
 
Since there are significant correlations, it is possible that one or more of the significant 
pairings may be due to the correlation between the variables. For example, the total number of 
holdings may only be significantly different between the genders because number of holdings is 
significantly correlated to % Assets in Top 10 Holdings. We have not tested for this possibility. 
 
The next group of tables, Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 present our analysis of current mutual 
fund managers. This is also where we begin examining whether gender is a factor in mutual fund 
performance. In Table 2.5, we present some descriptive statistics for individual regressions run 
on returns of female and male funds. Also a t-test was performed to see if the means of the two 
samples was equal. All 2,217 funds were examined for this table. The most notable result here is 
that almost none of the means between female and male managers are significantly different. 
This result holds true for both single-index models as well as the Fama-French 3-factor model.
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Table 2.5. T-Test of Equal Means for Individual Regressions on Current Fund Managers 
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The only exceptions are in the Carhart 4-factor model. Here, the momentum factor (UMD) is 
significantly different at the 5% level indicating that female managers display more momentum 
behavior in their investing techniques. Also in the Carhart model, the abnormal returns (alpha) 
are lower for female managers, although, this result is only significant at the 10% level. 
 
In Table 2.6, we analyze panel data, but only for the managers currently in control of 
their funds using equations (1A) and (2A). All 2,217 funds were used for this analysis. GENDER 
is a dummy that is equal to one if the fund is currently being managed by a female, and zero if 
being managed by a male. A pooled regression is performed. The results show that the gender 
dummy is not significant in any of the four models. So, from this regression, one may conclude 
that the mutual fund manager’s gender does not affect fund performance cross-sectionally among 
current fund managers. 
 
Our third analysis for current managers is presented in Table 2.7. Here we run separate 
pooled regressions on all fund returns currently being managed by either a female or a male. 
Abnormal returns are then obtained and compared between genders using a seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) technique. We subtract the male alpha from the female alpha, and then see if 
the result is significantly positive or negative. The first thing to notice in this table is that all of 
the abnormal return (alpha) coefficients are significant except for the one for female managers 
using the Fama-French 3 factors. Also, all alphas are positive except for the ones reported with 
the Carhart factors. So, it is very dependent on the factors used as to whether one would believe 
that managers outperform the market or underperform the market. Next, we notice that female 
managers always have lower alphas than male managers. We also find that the difference in  
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Table 2.6. Gender Significance in Current Mutual Fund Managers 
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Table 2.7. Alpha Comparison for Current Managers 
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alphas is significant in all four regressions. This indicates that current female managers, as a 
group, perform slightly worse than their male counterparts, between (0.01% and 0.06% per 
month). When reviewing all three analyses of current managers from Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, we 
can say it seems that for current managers, gender is not a significant factor in determining 
returns of individual funds, but, when all funds are analyzed simultaneously as a group, female 
managers exhibit slightly lower performance than their male counterparts. 
 
Beginning with Table 2.8, and extending through Table 2.12, we look at differences in 
performance between genders when there is a major change in the gender of mutual fund 
management within a single mutual fund. For this analysis, we use the second sub-sample of 
data. The data used for these tables includes only funds that have a major change in management 
gender during the life of the fund or as far back as 20 years (March 1984), whichever is shorter. 
 
For the analysis in Table 2.8, we use equations (1B) and (2B). Change12 is equal to one 
during the period when there is a higher percentage of female managers. For this table, we 
analyze the concluding 12-month period for previous management, skip a six-month window so 
that new management can adjust the fund’s portfolio according to its preferred method of 
investing, and analyze the following 12-month period for new management. These constraints 
effectively reduce our sample size. Often, management changes rapidly enough that either 
previous or post-management does not stay in place long enough to meet our criteria. As such, 
there are 129 instances of a change in the gender of a manager either from male-to-female (79) 
or female-to-male (50) among the 102 funds in our sample that meet our criteria for this table. 
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Table 2.8 is split into three panels. The number of observations is listed for each model 
because the Russell 1000 has less data than the other indexes, and therefore fewer observations. 
Note that the fixed-effects p-values are mixed in this table. So, we perform SBIC test for pooled 
and fixed effects. All of the SBIC results favor using the pooled regression. Further, none of the 
fixed-effects results were materially different from the pooled regressions. So for ease of 
comparison, we show only pooled regressions for all three panels. Panel A displays the results 
from all 129 changes in management gender. Here we see that the CHANGE12, the variable 
indicating whether or not a change in manager gender is significant, is negative, but not 
significant in any of the equations. Also the abnormal return (alpha) is not significant in the 
single index equations, but it is in the multi-factor equations. To see if there is a difference 
depending upon whether the earlier or later management gender mix has a higher percentage of 
female managers, we separate the data into male-to-female changes in management in Panel B, 
and female-to-male changes in Panel C. Panel B shows the results of a change from a lower 
percentage of female managers to a higher percentage of female managers (i.e. male-to-female). 
In this regression, CHANGE12 is now positive, but again it is not significant, but the abnormal 
return is now negative and significant in all equations. In Panel C, changes in management 
gender from a higher percentage of female mangers to a lower percentage of female managers 
(i.e. female-to-male) are shown. In this panel, the CHANGE12 variable is now significant (and 
negative) in all equations, and the abnormal return is no longer significant. So, in interpreting the 
12-month regressions, it appears that abnormal returns are significant only when management 
changes from a lower percentage to a higher percentage of female managers, suggesting that, in 
this case, all managers have significantly negative returns and there is no significant difference in 
the gender of the manager. However, when management changes from a higher percentage to a  
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Table 2.8. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (12-Months Before and After) 
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Table 2.8. (continued) 
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Table 2.8. (continued) 
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lower percentage of female managers, the gender of the manager is significant. In this case, the 
female managers impact the returns of the fund negatively. This implies that the fund returns 
become better after the new management is in place (since, in this case, the new management has 
a lower percentage of females). 
 
In Table 2.9, we perform the same exercise as in Table 2.8, but here we use 24 months of 
data both before and after the six-month window to see if the results are consistent. For this 
analysis, we again use equations (1B) and (2B). Change24 is equal to one during the period 
when there is a higher percentage of female managers. The sample size is affected dramatically 
due to the relatively rapid changes in management composition. There are 75 instances of a 
change in the gender of a manager either from male-to-female (44) or female-to-male (31) 
among the 102 funds in our sample that meet our criteria for this table. In Panel A, we show all 
changes in management gender in the sample. The abnormal return is negative and significant in 
all cases, whereas the CHANGE24 variable is positive in the single-index regressions and 
negative in the multi-factor models, but insignificant in all cases. In Panel B, where we look at 
changes from a lower percentage of female mangers to a higher percentage, the abnormal return 
is negative and significant in all regressions. The CHANGE24 variable is positive and significant 
in the one-index models, but becomes insignificant in the multi-factor models. When looking at 
Panel C, the female-to-male changes, the abnormal return is significant only in the multi-factor 
models, but the CHANGE24 variable is now negative and significant in all models. So, in the 
24-month regressions, we have mostly similar results to the 12-month regressions. Alphas, when 
significant, are always negative, the CHANGE24 variable is only consistently significant when 
changing from a higher percentage of female mangers to a lower percentage (i.e. female-to-male  
 108
Table 2.9. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (24-Months Before and After) 
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Table 2.9. (continued) 
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Table 2.9. (continued) 
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shift in management). The only new result in this table is that there is some evidence that female 
management has a positive influence on returns when management changes from a lower 
percentage of female managers to a higher percentage (i.e. male-to-female shift in management). 
If this is true, it indicates that former management is being replaced by better management, 
regardless of gender. However, the evidence is not strong as the results are only significant in the 
24-month, single-index regressions. 
 
In Tables 2.10 and 2.11, we do a comparison of abnormal returns similar to the one 
performed in Table 2.7. Here, we are analyzing both the 12-month (Table 2.10) and 24-month 
(Table 2.11) returns from identical data used for Tables 2.8 and 2.9. As in Table 2.7, we run 
separate pooled regressions on all fund returns being managed either by a female or a male in the 
sample. Abnormal returns are then obtained and compared between genders using a seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) technique. The alphas from the regressions with a higher male 
concentration in management are then subtracted from the alpha from the regressions that have a 
higher concentration of female managers. If the results are significant and positive, we may 
conclude that funds with a higher concentration of male managers outperform funds with a 
higher concentration of female managers. Panels A, B and C are separated in a similar way to 
those in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. 
 
In Table 2.10, our sample consists of 129 instances of a change in the gender of a 
manager either from male-to-female (79) or female-to-male (50) among the 102 funds in our 
sample that meet our criteria for this table. In Panel A, we look at all major changes in 
management gender. The abnormal returns are negative and significant for both higher and lower 
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Table 2.10. Alpha Comparison for Change in Manager Gender (12 Months Before and After) 
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Table 2.10. (continued) 
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Table 2.10. (continued) 
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percentages of female managers except for the lower percentage of female managers in the 
single-index regressions where they are not significant. Further, the difference between the 
alphas is significant and negative. This indicates that, in general, abnormal returns are negative. 
But, when there is a higher percentage of females managing a fund, the abnormal return is 
slightly, but significantly more negative. We get a much different picture when looking at Panel 
B, though. In this panel, we are examining changes in gender from a lower percentage of female 
managers to a higher percentage of female managers. Here the abnormal returns are mostly 
negative and significant as well. However, the period with the higher percentage of female 
managers has significantly higher (less negative) abnormal returns than the managers with a 
lower percentage of females. This suggests that female managers contribute positively to a 
fund’s returns if they are replacing male managers. When we examine Panel C, we see an 
explanation for the results in Panel A. In Panel C, we are looking at changing the management 
gender from a higher percentage of female managers to a lower percentage. The results for the 
abnormal returns are negative and significant for the period with a higher percentage of female 
managers, but insignificant for the period with the lower percentage of female managers. This 
indicates, that when being replaced by male managers, female managers have a lower 
performance record than the incoming manager(s). Interestingly, when taking the three panels 
together, and looking at the comparison of differences in alpha, we can see that the differences in 
Panel C are more negative than the positive results in Panel B (i.e. their absolute values are 
greater). So, it looks as if the negative differences in Panel C are driving the significant results in 
Panel A. So, the conclusion for Table 2.10 is that new management tends to have better 
abnormal returns than former management. The results are slightly increased if new management 
is changing from a higher female percentage to a lower female percentage (female management 
 116
to male management). As stated earlier, in Table 2.11, we look at the same question as Table 
2.10, but use 24 months of data before and after the six-month window rather than 12 months. 
The sample includes 75 instances of a change in the gender of a manager either from male-to-
female (44) or female-to-male (31) among the 102 funds in our sample that meet our criteria for 
this table. This is an identical sample to the one used for Table 2.9. For this analysis, we run 
separate pooled regressions for female and male managers in the sample. Abnormal returns are 
then obtained and compared between genders using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
technique. For Panel B and Panel C, the qualitative results are exactly the same as for Table 2.10 
(using 12 months of data before and after the six-month window). However, Panel A has one 
interestingly different result from Table 2.10. For the single-index regressions, the difference 
between the higher percentage of female managers and the lower percentage is positive and 
significant. While not conclusive, it does suggest that the results are mixed as to whether a higher 
percentage of female managers contributes positively or negatively to a fund’s returns. 
 
Our next look at whether gender affects fund performance is illustrated in Table 2.12. For 
this analysis, we looked at the same sample as in the previous analysis, the 102 funds that have 
150 major changes in gender management, either from male to female or from female to male. 
However, rather than look only at the manager tenures immediately before and after a change in 
manager gender composition, we look at the entire time-series of each fund and assign a 
percentage of female managers to each month of the fund’s existence or as far back as 20 years 
(March 1984), whichever is less. As an example, this number is equal to 1 if the only managers 
of a fund are female or 0.25 if there are four managers of a particular fund and one of them is 
female. The variable picks up changes in gender composition of fund management for the entire 
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Table 2.11. Alpha Comparison for Change in Manager Gender (24 Months Before and After) 
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Table 2.11. (continued) 
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Table 2.12. Percentage Change in Management Gender Composition 
 Russell 1000 SP500 Fama-French 3 Factors Carhart 4 Factors 
 Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. Factor Est. Coeff. 
 Alpha 0.19785 *** Alpha 0.24161 *** Alpha 0.05921 * Alpha -0.00714  
  0.04175   0.03381   0.03062   0.03195  
 FEMALE -0.07954  FEMALE -0.09087  FEMALE -0.12715 ** FEMALE -0.13198 ** 
  0.07148   0.06101   0.05499   0.05490  
 RUS1000 0.90926 *** SP500 0.89482 *** RMRF 0.88380 *** RMRF 0.90442 ***
  0.00679   0.00577   0.00535   0.00607  
       SMB 0.16983 *** SMB 0.18356 ***
        0.00717   0.00741  
       HML -0.02276 *** HML 0.02238 ** 
        0.00617   0.00881  
          UMD 0.04696 ***
           0.00656  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.6012   0.6035   0.6785   0.6795  
Fixed Effects F-Test 0.7271   0.8469   0.9874   0.9880  
Fixed Effects P-Value 0.9819   0.8640   0.5173   0.5155  
 
Panel regressions were performed using all cases where there was at one time (since March 1984) a major change in management 
gender composition, either from female to male or male to female. The following equations were tested: 
tptpptpptp FemaleIr ,,, εγβα +++=  and tptpp
J
i
tiipptp FemaleIr ,,
1
,,, εγβα +++= ∑
=
, where Female is equal to the percentage of 
female managers managing a fund for a given month. All months of the fund for which data is available are included. So, the 
following must hold for all months: 0 <= Female <= 1. A major change is defined as at least 50% of the managers of a fund at a 
specific time must be female (male) and change to at least 50% male (female). The same manager composition must remain in control 
of the fund for at least 12 months both before and after the date of change in gender composition. This resulted in a sample of 102 
funds with a total of 150 gender composition changes. Standard errors are below coefficients. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at 
the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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time-series for the past 20 years. We introduce a variable, FEMALE, into each of the factor 
models to see if it is significant as shown in equations (1C) and (2C). The panel regression 
technique is used. The fixed-effects R-squared is lower than the pooled regression R-squared 
which causes the fixed-effects F-statistic to be insignificant, signifying the fixed-effects 
regression is less efficient. Therefore we report the pooled regression findings. 
 
The results show that in the single-index models, the percentage of female fund managers 
is negative, but not significant. However, in the multi-factor models, the FEMALE variable is 
both negative and significant. We believe the multi-factor models are likely better than the 
single-index models for two reasons. First, the alpha (abnormal returns), which were significant 
in the single-index models, are less significant in the three-factor model and not at all significant 
in the four-factor model. From theory, one would expect this value to be insignificant if markets 
are efficient. The other reason that the multi-factor models may be better is that they consistently 
have higher adjusted R-squareds, indicating that these models can explain a higher percentage of 
the excess returns in the funds. So, since all coefficients on the FEMALE variable are negative, 
when interpreting the results presented in this table, the regressions suggest that an increase in 
the percentage of female managers of a particular fund should produce a corresponding decrease 
the excess returns of that fund. 
 
So, from the analyses that examine whether differences exist in performance between 
genders when there is a major change in the gender of mutual fund management within a single 
mutual fund, we find some mixed evidence. It appears conclusive from Tables 2.8 – 2.11 that 
when there is a major change in the gender composition of fund management, incoming 
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management typically performs better than outgoing management. However, there is also some 
evidence that suggests that new management performs better when changing from female-to-
male management than when changing from male-to-female management. Also, results from 
Table 2.12 suggest that the percentage of females managing a fund in inversely related to 
performance. But this result does not hold for all regressions. So, our conclusion is that we have 
uncovered some evidence that male managers outperform female managers over time, but the 
evidence is not conclusive and needs further investigation. 
 
Our final analysis looks at the question of what factors contribute to the abnormal excess 
returns found in mutual funds, and whether these factors differ by gender. These regressions are 
cross-sectional regressions based upon values on February 29, 2004. The abnormal excess 
returns used are derived using heteroskedastic-consistent ordinary least squares regressions from 
the single-index and multi-factor models. For this analysis all 2,217 funds are examined. 
 
The results of the regressions in Table 2.13 show that all of the factors are significant in 
more than one regression thereby being potentially important in determining abnormal returns. 
But, only the expense ratio is significant in all four regressions. The dummy term for the 
manager’s gender is insignificant in all regressions. Also, when the interaction terms are 
considered for female managers, very few are significant. In fact, only when abnormal returns 
are derived using the S&P 500 is as the proxy for the market are any of the interaction terms 
significant. The other three equations have no significant differences between male and female 
managers. So, although the results are mixed as to which specific factors are important in 
determining abnormal returns, from these regressions, we can conclude that there is no
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Table 2.13. Determinants of Abnormal Return 
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significant difference between male and female managers in the determinants of abnormal 
returns. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Literature in recent years suggests that females are more conservative investors than 
males. But fund managers typically have more investment education than the average person. So, 
the question of whether or not female fund managers exhibit more conservative tendencies is an 
interesting one. Along with this question, we explore whether or not the investment decisions of 
female fund managers affect the performance of the funds that they manage in a different way 
than do the investment decisions of male managers. 
 
We find a few differences in the matched comparison that suggest that female managers 
have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation). Therefore, they spread their risk out over many 
stocks and hold few assets in their top 10 holdings. Also, females manage no-load funds 
significantly more than males in the value category. 
 
In our analyses of current fund managers, when we look at the individual funds 
separately, we find that there are no significant differences in performance of mutual funds due 
to management gender. This is consistent with Atkinson et al. (2003) where they examine fixed-
income funds. However, when female and male managers’ returns are pooled and compared with 
each other, we find weak, but significant evidence that current female fund managers, when 
analyzed as a group, show slightly lower performance than male managers. 
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We then analyze performance within funds over time. Here, the most consistent result is 
that when changing the composition of fund management, regardless of gender, the new 
management has significantly greater performance than prior management. Although not 
conclusive, there is some evidence that one would receive a larger increase in performance if 
investing in a fund that is reducing the percentage of its female management (i.e. increasing the 
male percentage), although both increasing and decreasing the percentage of female managers 
will result in better returns with new management. 
 
We also find that the percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively 
related to the fund’s performance over time. Finally, we find that the determinants of abnormal 
returns (e.g. expense ratio, net assets, etc.) cannot be attributed to the gender of the fund 
managers. 
 
From the results presented, one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that one should 
avoid funds that are adding female managers (or reducing male managers) to their management 
teams and prefer funds that are adding male managers (or reducing female managers) to their 
management teams. This investment strategy should be cautioned against. The strongest results 
we obtained were that new management performs better than old management when there is a 
major change in the gender composition of the fund’s management. All results that suggest that 
female managers might have lower performance than male managers also have some mixed 
result that indicates that either the conclusion is not a strong one or that the opposite conclusion 
may also be drawn. The one result in this category that does not have contradictory results is the 
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percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively related to the fund’s performance 
over time. However, there are at least two possible explanations for this result that are not 
explored here. As was noted earlier, except for the analysis using current managers, we used 20 
years of data for our analyses. It may be possible that female managers were less qualified in the 
earlier part of the period than more recently. Also, in an attempt to be politically correct, funds 
may want to add female managers to their teams, regardless of whether there are male 
counterparts who are more qualified for the same position. Either of these explanations would 
suggest that funds might have added less qualified female managers to their teams to the 
detriment of fund performance. We leave exploration of these possible explanations to future 
research. 
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